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A Saturday Night in 1979: How the Fed Broke a 15-Year Inflation, and What It Cost

Painting of a columned government building in Washington at night with lit windows, autumn leaves on the steps, and three reporters seen from behind climbing the stairs, one carrying a vintage TV camera
Summary

On the evening of Saturday 6 October 1979 the US Federal Reserve called an unscheduled press conference and changed how it ran monetary policy. Interest rates went to about 20%, two recessions followed, farmers blockaded the Fed with tractors, and inflation finally broke. How the Volcker shock worked, why gradual fixes had failed, and what it still says about credibility. Analysis with a short opinion section. Not investment advice.

Central banks today like to be boring. Decisions come on scheduled dates, at scheduled times, after weeks of hints. On the evening of Saturday 6 October 1979 the US Federal Reserve did the opposite. Reporters were called at short notice to the Fed’s headquarters in Washington, the Eccles Building, for a rare press conference. The Fed’s chairman, Paul Volcker, told them the policy committee had held an unscheduled meeting that day and was changing the way it ran American money.

What followed is known as the Volcker shock. It is the episode every central banker still thinks about when inflation refuses to go away, so it is worth knowing what actually happened, and what it cost.

Fifteen years of drift

The problem was old by 1979. According to the Federal Reserve’s own history of the Great Inflation, consumer price inflation was a little over 1% a year in 1964. It climbed through the late 1960s and the 1970s, through the end of the dollar’s link to gold in 1971 (a story I told last week), two oil shocks, wage and price controls and a voluntary “Whip Inflation Now” campaign that the same essay simply calls “a failure”.

The Fed history site is blunt about the cause. Oil shocks and government spending gave inflation the opportunity, but the source was monetary policy that let the money supply grow too fast. Policymakers believed they could buy permanently lower unemployment with a bit more inflation, a trade-off known as the Phillips curve. Economists Edmund Phelps and Milton Friedman had warned in 1967 and 1968 that people would learn to expect inflation and the trade-off would vanish. They were right. By the late 1970s the US had both high inflation and high unemployment, which became known as stagflation.

Each time the Fed tightened, it backed off when unemployment rose. The essay on Volcker’s announcement describes the pattern: the Fed tightened in 1973, eased in the face of higher unemployment before inflation was contained, and inflation bottomed at 5% in December 1976 before rising again. By January 1979 prices were up 7.7% on a year earlier by the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, and the dollar had lost 12% against major currencies since late 1976.

A new chairman and a strange Saturday

Volcker took office in August 1979. The Great Inflation essay says year-on-year inflation was then running above 11%, with unemployment just under 6%. He was not a newcomer: his biography notes that as a Treasury official he had played an important role in the 1971 decision to suspend gold convertibility, which he called the most significant single event of his career. His 1949 Princeton senior thesis had already criticised the Fed for failing to curb post-war inflation.

At his confirmation hearing he promised to make inflation his top priority. Over late summer the Fed nudged rates higher, and unemployment started rising towards 6%. The Fed history site quotes an unnamed Treasury official telling the Wall Street Journal in September that the Fed would be forced to cut rates once unemployment hit 7%, because Congress would not bear the burden. Markets had heard that story many times.

The October announcement was designed to break it. Until then the Fed steered the federal funds rate, the overnight rate banks charge each other, within a narrow band. From now on it would control the volume of bank reserves instead and let the interest rate go wherever the market pushed it. Volcker said this openly: the daily rate was “apt to fluctuate over a wider range” than in recent years. In plain words, the Fed would stop protecting borrowers from high rates in order to get control of money growth.

The bill

The bill was large. The Fed history essay says the federal funds rate reached a record 20% in late 1980; Volcker’s Wikipedia biography puts the peak at 20% in June 1981 and the banks’ prime lending rate at 21.5% that year. The economy went through a short recession in the first half of 1980 and then a deeper one from July 1981 to November 1982. Unemployment peaked at 10.8% in late 1982.

The anger was real and very visible. Farmers drove tractors to the Fed and blockaded its building. Car dealers sent coffins containing the keys of cars they could not sell. Homebuilders posted pieces of lumber. People wrote to Volcker that they had saved for years to buy a house and now could not. In Congress, members of both parties attacked the Fed; one threatened a bill to impeach Volcker and most of the board, and by the summer of 1982 the House Majority Leader was calling for his resignation. The Treasury Secretary criticised the Fed in the press, and Volcker answered in public that the Fed would not ease.

The shock was not only American. Volcker’s biography notes that it caused strong disturbances in the European Monetary System and has been heavily criticised in Europe.

Did it work?

On inflation, yes. The two Fed essays use different price measures, so their peaks differ: inflation by the PCE measure peaked at 11.6% in March 1980, while consumer price inflation was close to 15% around the same time. Either way, by the end of the 1982 recession year-on-year inflation was back under 5%, and the PCE measure fell to 3.7% in 1983. Unemployment then declined steadily, and the US entered the long stretch of steadier growth that economists call the Great Moderation.

The Fed’s own reading is that the key gain was credibility. Gradualism, the idea of easing inflation down slowly with small rate moves, had failed for over a decade because nobody believed the Fed would hold firm when jobs were lost. By persevering through a large recession, the Fed showed it would. Its history essay adds that the recession turned out smaller than many gradualists had predicted. The lasting legacy is that most central banks now publish numerical inflation targets and treat price stability as the anchor for everything else.

Opinion: what I take from it

The Volcker story is often told as a tale of one brave man. I think the more useful lesson is about promises. For fifteen years the Fed said it cared about inflation, and everyone priced in that it would blink at 7% unemployment. Words could not fix that. Only a costly act, repeated under heavy political attack, made the promise believable again. That is uncomfortable, because it means the price of lost credibility is paid by people who did not lose it: the farmer, the car dealer, the family that could not buy a house.

The second lesson is that the shock was a choice made under pressure from elected officials in both parties, and the Fed only survived it because it had enough independence to say no for three years. Whenever politicians argue that central banks should be more obedient, I think it is worth remembering who was asking for cuts in 1981 and 1982, and what would have happened if they had got them.

None of this means every inflation needs a 20% rate. 1979 came after fifteen years of drift. The cheaper path is never to let expectations slip that far.

This is not investment advice.

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