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The 'Temporary' Suspension That Has Lasted 55 Years: How the Dollar Left Gold in 1971

A heavy steel vault door half open on stacks of gold bars, with old banknotes, a rotary telephone and a desk calendar reading August 15, 1971 on a wooden desk
Summary

On a Sunday evening in August 1971, a US president told the world he was 'temporarily' suspending the dollar's link to gold. It never came back. Why the Bretton Woods system broke, what the Triffin dilemma is, and why the fixes failed. Analysis with a short opinion section. Not investment advice.

On the evening of Sunday, 15 August 1971, while American markets were closed, President Richard Nixon went on television and said this: “I have directed Secretary Connally to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold or other reserve assets.” The word temporarily is right there in the official transcript.

Fifty-five years later, no foreign government can hand dollars to the US Treasury and walk away with gold. The “temporary” suspension became the founding moment of the money system we all live in now, where the major currencies float against each other and nothing physical stands behind them. Here is how it happened, and why the people who built the old system could not save it.

The deal made at Bretton Woods

In July 1944, 44 Allied countries met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to design the post-war money system. As the Federal Reserve’s history site explains, they remembered the 1930s, when countries kept cheapening their currencies to steal each other’s exports, and they wanted stability instead. The design was simple. Other currencies were pegged to the dollar, and the dollar was pegged to gold at $35 an ounce. A country could change its peg only in exceptional cases of “fundamental disequilibrium.”

The system only became fully operational in 1958, once European countries dropped their post-war exchange controls. At first it looked unbreakable. According to the Fed essay on the end of convertibility, the United States held about three-quarters of the world’s official gold reserves, and war-damaged Europe and Japan were hungry for American goods and the dollars to pay for them.

The flaw built into the design

The problem was that the world needed more and more dollars to trade and to hold as reserves, and the only way to get them was for the United States to send more dollars abroad than it took back in. Military spending, foreign aid and American investment overseas did exactly that. Gold, meanwhile, grew only a little.

This is the “Triffin dilemma,” named after the economist Robert Triffin. The Fed essay puts it this way: a country that issues the world’s reserve currency has to keep supplying it, but the more it supplies, the more people doubt the currency, until its role as a reserve is threatened. Eventually there were more dollars in foreign hands than gold in American vaults. The Wikipedia summary, citing Barry Eichengreen, gives a snapshot: by 1966 foreign central banks held $14 billion in dollars, while the US had $13.2 billion in gold, of which only $3.2 billion was available to cover foreign holdings.

Everyone could see the arithmetic. If enough holders asked for gold at once, the US could not pay at $35. That made a run rational: whoever asked first got gold, and whoever waited might get a devalued dollar.

A decade of patches

Washington and its allies spent the 1960s trying to buy time. The Fed history lists the patches. In 1961 the Treasury began intervening in currency markets. From 1962 the Fed set up “swap lines” with foreign central banks, reaching nine countries and $900 million by the end of that year, so they would hold on to dollars instead of cashing them for gold. Also in 1961, eight central banks formed the London Gold Pool to sell gold together and hold the market price at $35, after a run had pushed it to $40 in October 1960.

The State Department historian adds restrictions on foreign lending and investment under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Its verdict is short: “Nothing worked.” France withdrew from the Gold Pool, which collapsed in March 1968. After that, gold at $35 was only available to central banks, not private buyers.

There was also a domestic side. From the mid-1960s the US chose full employment over defending the dollar. The Fed’s Robert Hetzel writes that political pressure made it “nearly impossible” for the Fed to raise interest rates for balance-of-payments reasons. US inflation rose, and because other countries were pegged to the dollar, they had to absorb the flood of dollars and import that inflation too.

The summer of 1971

By 1971 the strain was open. According to the Wikipedia account, West Germany stopped defending its peg in May, Switzerland followed, and in August Britain asked for $3 billion of its dollar holdings to be covered in gold. Paul Volcker, then a senior Treasury official, later wrote that if the British were taking gold, “it was clear the game was indeed over.”

From 13 to 15 August, Nixon and his advisers met secretly at Camp David. The plan they produced had three parts, as the State Department historian describes: close the “gold window,” freeze wages and prices for 90 days, and put an extra 10 percent tariff on dutiable imports. The tariff was a lever to force trading partners to revalue their currencies upward.

At home it was a hit. Abroad it was seen, in the historian’s words, as “worrisome unilateralism.” In his speech Nixon blamed “international money speculators” and told Americans that if they bought American products, “your dollar will be worth just as much tomorrow as it is today.”

The fixes that did not hold

In December 1971 the Group of Ten met at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington and agreed new pegs around a weaker dollar. The Fed essay on Bretton Woods puts the effective devaluation at about 10 percent; the official gold price went from $35 to $38. Nixon called it “the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world.”

It lasted about fifteen months. Hetzel notes that the Fed kept cutting rates to chase full employment, so dollars kept flowing out. In February 1973 the dollar was devalued again, and in March 1973, faced with yet more dollar inflows, the major countries let their currencies float. The State Department calls that the effective abandonment of Bretton Woods. The wage-price freeze had a similar arc: the Fed essay says inflation “was practically halted” during the 90 days but soon came back, and the decade became known as the Great Inflation.

Opinion: what I take from it

The lesson I find most useful is not about gold. It is that a promise which the arithmetic cannot support will eventually be tested, and the patches mostly decide when, not whether. Swap lines, gold pools and capital controls each worked for a while. Together they gave policymakers a decade to fix the underlying imbalance, and the decade was spent on other priorities.

I also notice how the word “temporarily” did real work. It let a permanent change arrive without a panic on the night it was announced. That is not a scandal. Sometimes it is the only way to make a necessary change. But it is a reason to read official language about “temporary” measures with care, in any country and any decade.

Finally, the Triffin dilemma did not disappear in 1973. The world still uses the dollar as its main reserve currency, and the tension between supplying the world and keeping trust at home is still argued over by economists today. The gold is gone from the story. The dilemma is not.

This is not investment advice.

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