The Mississippi Bubble: How One Man Ran France's Money, Taxes and Debt, and Lost It All in 1720
In 1719 a Scottish gambler controlled France's central bank, its tax collection, its mints and its national debt, all inside one company whose shares rose about twentyfold in months. How John Law's System worked, why it collapsed in 1720, and what it still teaches about mixing a central bank, a state's debts and a stock price. Analysis with a short opinion section. Not investment advice.
Last week on this blog I looked at the tulip mania, a bubble that may have been smaller than its legend. The Mississippi Bubble of 1720 is the opposite case. It was bigger, stranger and far better documented, and it was not a frenzy over a flower. For a brief moment, one private company held the entire revenue-raising power of the French state. Its founder was a Scottish gambler who had once been sentenced to death for killing a man in a duel.
His name was John Law, and the scheme he built is known in French as le système de Law, Law’s System. It is worth understanding because almost every piece of it, from paper money to a central bank buying assets to support prices, still exists today in some form.
A gambler with a theory of money
Law was born in Edinburgh in 1671 into a family of bankers and goldsmiths, according to his Wikipedia biography. In 1694 he killed Edward Wilson in a duel in London, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, saw the sentence reduced, and escaped to Amsterdam. He spent years moving around Europe, gambling with real skill and studying finance.
He also had a serious theory. Law argued that money creation stimulated an economy, that paper money was better than metal, and that a national bank should issue notes and expand credit. In 1705 he proposed a bank like this for Scotland, and it was rejected. France, broke after the wars of Louis XIV, proved more willing. In 1716 the regent, Philippe d’Orléans, let him open a private bank that took gold deposits and issued banknotes. The New York Fed’s history series notes it was then one of only six banks in Europe to have issued paper money. The French state bought it in 1718, and it became the Banque Royale.
One company that swallowed a state
The second piece was a trading company. In August 1717 Law founded the Compagnie d’Occident, which was granted all of Louisiana and a 25-year trading monopoly, as the Wikipedia history of the company records. Louisiana then had only about 500 French colonists. The company’s people founded New Orleans in 1718 and named it after the regent.
The clever part was how people paid for the shares. They were priced at 500 livres but could be paid entirely in government debt bills at face value, at a time when those bills traded at a discount. In effect, the company swapped the state’s unloved IOUs for shares in a business with a royal monopoly.
Then Law kept buying. In 1718 and 1719 the company took over the tobacco monopoly, the Senegal company, the East Indies and China companies, the North African trade, the right to run all the royal mints, the right to collect most excise taxes and, in late August 1719, all direct taxes too. By then it was the collector of all taxes and the owner of all debt owed to and by the French kingdom. In May 1719 it was renamed the Compagnie des Indes, but people simply called it the Mississippi Company. In February 1720 it absorbed the bank as well. The central bank, the tax office, the mint and the national debt were now one listed company.
Twenty times in a few months
Each acquisition meant new shares, and the share price, which had sat near 500 livres, took off. Shares traded in the open air on rue Quincampoix in Paris. They reached 750 livres on 17 June 1719, 1,000 on 21 July, 2,000 a week later and 3,000 on 17 August. Wikipedia gives a peak of 10,000 livres; the New York Fed account says the price ultimately reached 15,000, so the exact top depends on the source.
Easy terms helped. The New York Fed describes a 1719 issue of 50,000 shares at 500 livres with only 75 livres down and the rest in monthly instalments. The price doubled before the second payment was due. Law then offered to retire the national debt of 1.5 billion livres by issuing another 300,000 shares. The word “millionaire” was coined for the people who got rich. In January 1720 Law himself became Controller-General of Finances, in charge of the whole economy.
Not everything was froth. His biography credits him with abolishing internal road and canal tolls, cheap loans to new industries, and a revival of overseas trade. The New York Fed says his single-tax reform cut the price of some products by a third.
How the machine ran in reverse
The weakness was that the bank stood behind the share price. When investors sold shares, they were paid in new banknotes, so the money supply in France roughly doubled. Inflation reached a monthly rate of 23% in January 1720, according to the company history. Some holders began swapping paper for gold coin, and Law answered with edicts limiting the use of coin.
In March 1720 he tried to fix the share price at 9,000 livres, promising to buy shares with banknotes. The New York Fed notes that far more sellers queued up than he expected, so he had to print more money and break the link to gold. On 21 May 1720 he tried a controlled cut in the value of both notes and shares, then reversed it six days later. People rushed to turn notes into coin, the bank closed for ten days and then limited withdrawals, and food prices rose by as much as 60%. Plague broke out in September 1720, choking trade further.
Shares fell to 2,000 livres by September 1720, 1,000 by December, and 500 by September 1721, right where they had started. Law was dismissed, fled to Brussels at the end of 1720, and died poor in Venice in 1729. The company went into receivership in April 1721 and came back in 1723 as a plain colonial trading firm, the French Indies Company, after the state paid it an indemnity of 514 million livres.
Why it still matters
The most quoted diagnosis came from the British banker Henry Thornton in 1802, cited in Law’s biography: Law “forgot that there might be no bounds to the demand for paper; that the increasing quantity would contribute to the rise of commodities: and the price of commodities require, and seem to justify, a still further increase.” Rising prices called for more money, which pushed prices up again.
The New York Fed authors tie it to a modern problem: who controls money creation, and how that sits with a state’s borrowing. They wrote in 2014 with the euro area’s debt crisis in mind, but the question is general.
Opinion: what I take from it
Law was not a simple fraud, and his ideas about paper money and credit were ahead of his time; much of today’s financial system works roughly the way he imagined. His fatal step was to tie the central bank to one share price. Once the bank promised to support the stock, every sale of shares became new money, and the person who should have been able to say “no” to the state and to the market was also the biggest shareholder and the government’s finance minister.
That is the lesson I find most useful. A central bank that buys assets is not dangerous in itself. It becomes dangerous when it can no longer stop, because it has made itself responsible for a price that only goes one way in a panic. The Rentenmark story from two days ago showed the same rule from the other side: money holds its value when the people issuing it are visibly able to refuse.
This is not investment advice.
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