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How Germany Stopped Hyperinflation in 1923 With a Currency Backed by Almost Nothing

Heaps and a wicker basket of crumpled old banknotes on a wooden desk under a brass lamp, with one crisp new banknote, a balance scale and a fountain pen in the foreground
Summary

In November 1923 a dollar cost 4.2 trillion German marks. Weeks later prices were stable again, thanks to a new currency with no gold behind it. How the Weimar hyperinflation happened, why the Rentenmark worked, and who paid the bill. Analysis with a short opinion section. Not investment advice.

In November 1923, a German who wanted one US dollar needed to hand over about 4.2 trillion paper marks. A loaf of bread in Berlin that had cost around 160 marks at the end of 1922 cost about 200 billion marks a year later, according to the Wikipedia summary of the Weimar hyperinflation. Then, within weeks, prices stopped climbing. The new money that did it, the Rentenmark, had no gold behind it at all.

Germans called this the “miracle of the Rentenmark” (Wunder der Rentenmark), as the German Historical Museum notes. It was really a set of hard choices made together, and it says something lasting about what makes money hold its value.

How a currency got to twelve zeros

The trouble started with the First World War. Germany stopped redeeming its banknotes in gold in 1914 and chose to fund the war mostly by borrowing instead of taxing. The Bundesbank’s own history page puts it plainly: the government borrowed from the public and, more and more, from the Reichsbank, the central bank, “which in turn printed more and more banknotes.” The German Historical Museum’s inflation chapter adds the figures. War costs reached about 164 billion marks, but only about 10 billion of that came from war levies and tax increases. The money in circulation grew fivefold between 1914 and 1918.

After the defeat, the new republic carried that debt, had to pay for war victims and a country in turmoil, and owed reparations under the Treaty of Versailles. In May 1921 the Allies fixed the total at 132 billion gold marks. The government kept covering its gaps by having the Reichsbank buy its short-term debt, which meant more printed money. The mark held roughly steady at about 320 to the dollar in the first half of 1922. After the foreign minister Walther Rathenau was murdered in June 1922 and confidence collapsed, it fell to about 7,400 to the dollar by December.

The final blow came in January 1923, when French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial heartland, to collect reparations Germany had failed to deliver. Berlin answered with “passive resistance,” in effect a general strike, and paid the strikers by printing still more money. By the autumn, the museum records, up to 133 outside firms with 1,783 printing presses were working day and night for the state printing office, and more than 5,800 towns, councils and companies issued their own emergency money. The Reichsbank’s largest note reached 100 trillion marks.

The Bundesbank describes the daily reality. Wages were paid every day in many places, people carried notes in bags and suitcases and ran to shops to spend them before prices rose again, and many traders would only sell for food or coal.

Why reparations are only part of the story

It is tempting to blame it all on Versailles. Historians are split on that. As the Wikipedia article summarises, drawing on the historian Sally Marks, Germany actually paid relatively little in cash between mid-1921 and 1924. Of roughly 3 billion gold marks due in 1922, only 435 million was paid in cash. Allied experts at the time argued that Berlin let the currency slide to dodge both reparations and painful tax reform, and Reich Chancellery records later showed that stabilisation was indeed put off in the hope of better reparations terms. The same source notes that Germany kept paying reparations from 1924 to 1931 without hyperinflation coming back.

There was also a less discussed winner. The Bundesbank page says the state benefited most, because its war debt of 154 billion marks was worth just 15.4 pfennigs on the day the Rentenmark arrived. The German Historical Museum gives slightly different figures, 164 billion marks shrinking to 16.4 pfennigs, but the point is the same. Inflation wiped out the government’s domestic debt, and it did so by wiping out the savings of the people who had lent to it.

What the Rentenmark actually was

Germany had too little gold to back a new currency, so Finance Minister Hans Luther used an idea from the economist Karl Helfferich: back it with real assets. The Wikipedia article on the Rentenmark and the German Historical Museum both describe the design. A new Rentenbank was set up in mid-October 1923, and land used by agriculture, industry and trade was charged with a mortgage of 3.2 billion gold marks. That charge stood behind the new notes. The Rentenbank began issuing them on 15 November 1923. One Rentenmark was set equal to one trillion paper marks, which put the dollar at 4.20 Rentenmarks, the same as the old pre-war gold mark.

On paper, this backing was weak. Nobody could swap a Rentenmark for a piece of a farm, and at first it was not even legal tender.

Why it worked anyway

What made it work was the rules around the new money. The Rentenmark article notes that its total issue was rigidly fixed, and the act creating it stopped the Reichsbank from continuing to discount bills, meaning it stopped turning government IOUs into fresh cash. Once Hjalmar Schacht became currency commissioner on 12 November 1923, the Reichsbank no longer discounted Treasury bills at all. The Rentenbank also refused credit to the government. The museum adds the second half: Luther and Schacht held the new rate by keeping money in short supply and cutting the budget hard, and the government balanced its budget by January 1924.

In other words, people trusted the new note because the printing press had been chained, not because of the mortgage on farmland. A new currency on top of deficits still funded by the central bank would have gone the way of the old one.

The Rentenmark was only ever meant as a bridge. On 30 August 1924, under the Dawes Plan that rescheduled reparations, it was replaced by the Reichsmark, which was backed by gold and foreign currency.

The bill nobody escaped

Stabilisation did not undo the damage. Savers who had held bonds, deposits or mortgages in marks had lost almost everything. A 1925 revaluation law brought some old mortgages back at 25% of face value and some government bonds at just 2.5%, to be paid only after reparations, according to the Wikipedia account. Meanwhile those who had borrowed heavily, like the industrialist Hugo Stinnes, had repaid their debts in worthless money, as the museum notes. The political fallout was immediate too: the same autumn brought separatist movements, street fighting in Hamburg and Hitler’s failed putsch in Munich on 8–9 November 1923.

The memory lasted. The Bundesbank writes that, partly because of these experiences, central banks have been made independent institutions charged with protecting the value of money, and that the Bundesbank served as the model for the structure of the euro system.

Opinion: what I take from it

The usual lesson people draw is “printing money causes hyperinflation.” That is true but incomplete. The more interesting lesson is about credibility. The Rentenmark’s backing was close to a fiction, yet it worked because it came with a believable promise that the state would stop paying its bills with new money, and the budget cuts showed that promise was real. The old mark had a printing press with no limits behind it. The new one had a limit that people could see.

So I am sceptical of any claim that a currency is safe simply because of what sits in a vault. What matters more is whether the people who control the money can and will say no to their own government. The 1923 episode also shows who pays when that line breaks: not the state, which saw its debt vanish, but ordinary savers who did what they were told and lent their money to their country.

This is not investment advice.

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