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Black Wednesday: The Day the Pound Fell Out of Europe's Currency Club

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Summary

On 16 September 1992 the Bank of England spent billions in a few hours defending the pound, raised interest rates twice in one day, and still had to take sterling out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism by evening. Why Britain joined at DM 2.95, what one remark from the Bundesbank did, what the day really cost, and how it led to inflation targeting. Analysis with a short opinion section. Not investment advice.

At 7.40 in the evening of Wednesday 16 September 1992, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, stood outside the Treasury and announced that the United Kingdom had suspended its membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (The Guardian, 2012). That morning the government had raised interest rates from 10% to 12%, and in the afternoon it promised 15%. Neither worked. By the next day rates were back at 10% and the pound was floating (Wikipedia: Black Wednesday).

Black Wednesday is usually told as the story of one speculator who “broke the Bank of England”. The more useful story is about a fixed exchange rate that no longer matched the economy underneath it, and about what happens when a central bank promises to defend a price it cannot defend forever.

Why Britain joined, and at what price

The Exchange Rate Mechanism was set up in 1979 to keep European currencies within agreed bands against each other, in practice around the strong Deutsche Mark. Britain stayed out at first. In the late 1980s Chancellor Nigel Lawson admired the Bundesbank’s record on inflation enough to have the Treasury quietly “shadow” the mark from early 1987 to March 1988. His successor, John Major, together with Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, persuaded the cabinet to join, and on 8 October 1990 the pound entered the ERM at 2.95 marks, with a floor of about 2.773 marks that the government was obliged to defend (Wikipedia).

The economic logic was borrowed credibility. If Britain could not convince markets on its own that inflation would come down, tying the pound to the mark would import the Bundesbank’s discipline. The weakness was that the two economies were not alike. In 1989 British inflation was about three times the West German rate and British interest rates were 15% (Wikipedia). Critics such as the Financial Times columnist Samuel Brittan thought 2.95 was simply too high a rate for British manufacturers to compete at.

The German problem

Then Germany reunified. The Bundesbank kept interest rates high to contain the inflationary effect of reunification spending, and every currency tied to the mark had to follow, whatever its own economy needed. Britain was in recession. High German rates were exactly the wrong medicine for it, but leaving them behind meant the pound would sink toward its floor (Wikipedia).

Politics added pressure. Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty in the spring of 1992, and France called its own referendum for 20 September. With polls suggesting a majority of French voters might say no, traders began to doubt that the path to a single currency would hold, and they sold the currencies sitting near the bottom of their bands: the Italian lira, the Spanish peseta, and the pound (The Guardian). Italy cracked first. The economic historian Alain Naef, using a pressure index built with Barry Eichengreen, shows Italy under strain well before Britain, and then Britain being hit suddenly and violently (Economic History Society, 2022).

One remark

The spark came from Frankfurt. On 15 September Bundesbank president Helmut Schlesinger told a journalist that, after the lira’s devaluation, a “more comprehensive realignment” of European currencies would be needed. Markets read it as saying the pound should be devalued too. Schlesinger said he thought he was off the record and later argued he had only stated a fact (Wikipedia). Naef calls it “friendly fire” and offers a counterfactual: in his model, without the remark the pound would still have been under pressure, but much less, and Britain could have stayed in the ERM (EHS). Like all counterfactuals, that one comes with caveats he states himself.

The day itself

ERM rules required the Bank of England to buy every pound offered at the floor. By mid-morning on the 16th it was buying around £2 billion of sterling an hour (The Guardian). Naef puts the day’s spending at more than £600,000 per second of market hours, roughly the annual GDP of Bulgaria and Croatia combined (EHS). The Bank’s former chief dealer, Jim Trott, later described looking for the Bundesbank to arrive with support: “We kept on looking over the hill, but there was no dust and there were no hats and no sabres” (The Guardian).

The rate rises failed because they were not believable. A 15% interest rate in the middle of a recession is a threat the government could not carry out for long, and dealers knew it (Wikipedia). Speculators, with George Soros’s Quantum Fund the best known, sold pounds they did not own, expecting to buy them back cheaper. Soros later said he made about £1 billion (The Guardian).

What it cost

For years the cost was murky. In the months before the crisis the Bank of England, which was not yet independent, sold almost $40 billion of foreign currency, while official figures showed reserves down by only £2 billion; papers released later described a “secret negative forward book” of forward swaps used partly to disguise the state of the reserves (The Independent). When the Treasury released its own analysis in February 2005, its conclusion was that “the most sensible assumptions give a loss of £3.3bn measured at February 1994” (Treasury minute via Margaret Thatcher Foundation). Earlier outside estimates had run from £13 billion to £27 billion. Most of the Treasury’s figure was not trading losses, which it put at around £800 million, but the profit Britain would have made on its foreign reserves if it had simply let the pound fall (Wikipedia).

The political cost was larger. The Conservatives’ share in the Gallup poll fell from 43% in September to 29% in October 1992, and the party’s reputation for economic competence never recovered before its 1997 defeat (Wikipedia).

What came after

Three weeks later, on 8 October 1992, Lamont set out a new framework: a target range of 1% to 4% for underlying inflation, measured by retail prices excluding mortgage interest, aiming for the lower half of that range by the end of the parliament (Bank of England, 1993). In 1997 the Bank was given operational independence, and the Bank’s own 2005 review notes that by early 2005 the UK had seen 51 quarters of uninterrupted growth with low and stable inflation (Bank of England, 2005).

The ERM itself did not survive in its old form. After another year of turmoil, European ministers widened the bands to plus or minus 15% from 2 August 1993 (IMF, 1993), wide enough that the fixed system was fixed mostly in name. France, which faced a similar attack days after Black Wednesday, held on, partly because, as Naef notes, it was essential to the European project and got active support that Britain did not (EHS).

Opinion

Opinion: Black Wednesday is a lesson about credibility, not about villains. A currency peg is a promise, and a promise is only as strong as the pain its maker is willing to bear to keep it. Britain’s promise required interest rates that its own recession could not tolerate, and it relied on help from a partner whose priorities were at home. Once markets saw that gap, the outcome was close to arithmetic. The odd twist is that the defeat produced something better: a monetary framework built on a domestic target the country actually controlled. Losing the peg was humiliating; keeping it, at that rate and with those German interest rates, would probably have been worse. This is an analysis of history, not investment advice.

Sources

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