The Plaza Accord: How Five Governments Talked Down the Dollar in 1985
On 22 September 1985 five finance ministers met at New York's Plaza Hotel and agreed, in carefully vague words, that the dollar should fall. It fell about 40% in two years. How the 'superdollar' arose, what the Plaza actually did, why the trade deficit took two years to respond, and whether the deal really doomed Japan. Analysis with a short opinion section. Not investment advice.
On Sunday 22 September 1985, the finance ministers and central bank governors of the five largest industrial economies met at the Plaza Hotel in New York. They came out with a statement that, read today, sounds almost sleepy: “some further orderly appreciation of the non-dollar currencies is desirable”, and they “stand ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful” (Frankel, NBER, 2015). The word “intervention” did not appear. Yet when markets opened on Monday, the dollar fell about 4% against a weighted basket of other currencies (Frankel).
The Plaza Accord is remembered as the high-water mark of international economic cooperation. It is also the subject of a long-running theory in Asia that the United States used it to sabotage Japan. Both stories are worth looking at, because the episode says a lot about what governments can and cannot do to a currency.
How the dollar got so strong
The problem was a dollar that had kept rising for five years. Jeffrey Frankel, a Harvard economist, puts the rise at 44% against other major currencies in the five years up to 1985; the Federal Reserve’s index went from 93 in September 1980 to 144 at the peak in February 1985 (Frankel). In March 1985 the pound hit its all-time low against the dollar, a level that held for more than 30 years (Wikipedia: Plaza Accord).
The first part of the rise had a textbook explanation. Paul Volcker’s tight monetary policy at the Fed and Ronald Reagan’s tax cuts and spending pushed up long-term interest rates, which drew in foreign capital and lifted the currency. The chairman of Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, Martin Feldstein, called it the “twin deficits”: a bigger budget deficit led, through the strong dollar, to a bigger trade deficit (Frankel).
The last leg was harder to explain. From March 1984 to February 1985 the dollar rose another 17%, even though the interest-rate gap that had justified it peaked in June 1984 and then moved the other way. Several economists at the time described it as a speculative bubble (Frankel).
Meanwhile the trade deficit grew to $112 billion in 1984 and a record $122 billion in 1985 (Frankel). American exporters, from grain farmers to Caterpillar, IBM and Motorola, campaigned for protection, and Congress began to consider protectionist laws (Wikipedia). Frankel recounts a telling side story: White House aides preparing Reagan’s 1985 trip to Germany reportedly went shopping for BMWs, which could be bought there for half the US price because of the exchange rate (Frankel).
From “benign neglect” to action
During Reagan’s first term the Treasury refused to act. Secretary Donald Regan saw the strong dollar as a vote of confidence in the US economy, and Under Secretary Beryl Sprinkel, a follower of Milton Friedman, said in 1981 that the US would intervene in currency markets only in “disorderly markets” (Frankel). France in particular wanted intervention. A G7 study it pushed for, the Jurgensen Report of 1983, was less supportive than the Europeans had hoped (Wikipedia).
The change came with personnel. In January 1985 Regan and James Baker swapped jobs, Baker becoming Treasury Secretary. At his confirmation hearing he said the previous stance against intervention was “obviously something that should be looked at” (Frankel). A G5 meeting on 17 January agreed to some intervention, and the German monetary authorities sold dollars heavily in February and March. The dollar peaked that February and had already fallen 13% by the time of the Plaza meeting (Frankel).
Preparations were kept secret. G5 deputies met in July and August, and a final meeting in London on 15 September worked out details. An unreleased “non-paper” drafted by US Assistant Secretary David Mulford named a target of a 10–12% fall in the dollar over the near term and up to $18 billion of intervention over six weeks, split among the five countries. By the end of October, the US had actually sold $3.2 billion and the other four $5 billion, with more than $2 billion more from other countries, notably Italy (Frankel).
Did it work?
On the narrow goal, yes, and more. Over 1985–87 the dollar came down about 40% (Frankel). In fact it overshot. In February 1987 the G7 met at the Louvre in Paris and agreed the dollar had fallen far enough, especially against the yen, and tried to stop it falling further (Frankel). Edwin Truman, writing for Rice University’s Baker Institute, judged that the Plaza “overachieved” on the dollar but did little to change the big countries’ economic policies (Baker Institute).
The trade balance took longer. In 1986 and 1987 the deficit kept getting worse, because imports became more expensive before people bought fewer of them, the pattern economists call the J-curve. The goods and services deficit peaked in the third quarter of 1987 at an annual rate of $152 billion and was down to $30 billion by 1991, helped also by a recession (Frankel). Congress did not pass the protectionist laws (Wikipedia).
The deeper question is how much the intervention itself did. Feldstein argued that it did almost nothing, since the dollar fell no faster in the six months after the Plaza than in the six months before (Frankel). Frankel’s own research with Kathryn Dominguez, using daily intervention data, found real effects, but mostly through expectations: publicly reported intervention changed what traders expected, and that moved the rate. It worked best when the market had no strong view, as in a bubble, and when the US joined in (Frankel). The sums were small against the market. What moved the dollar was the signal that the governments, and above all the US, now wanted it lower.
Did it doom Japan?
The yen rose more than the European currencies after the Plaza, and Japan’s economy mostly stagnated after 1990. That has fed a theory, widely repeated in Asia, that Washington deliberately broke Japan’s export machine (Frankel).
The timing does not fit well. Between the yen’s rise in 1985–86 and Japan’s recessions of the 1990s came the bubble years of 1987–89, when exchange-rate policy was working to support the dollar, not push up the yen (Frankel). The rising Deutsche Mark did not produce a bubble or a recession in Germany (Wikipedia). A fairer reading is that the strong yen prompted Japan to loosen monetary and fiscal policy heavily, and that stimulus, with other policies, fed the asset bubble (Wikipedia). The decisions that mattered were made in Tokyo.
The anti-Plaza world
Frankel’s most striking point is how the rules have flipped. In 1985, coordination meant governments jointly pushing a currency down. In February 2013, the G7 agreed to refrain from targeting exchange rates, which Frankel calls an “anti-Plaza” accord. A deliberate attempt to weaken a major currency would now be called currency manipulation (Frankel). The Bank of Japan’s last intervention he records was in March 2011, together with the US and others, after the Tōhoku earthquake (Frankel).
Opinion: a signal, not a lever
This is not investment advice.
I think the Plaza is usually remembered as a show of power: five governments decided where a currency should go, and it went. The evidence tells me something more modest. The dollar was already falling before the meeting, the money spent was small, and the effect came from changing expectations in a market that had lost its anchor. The Plaza worked because it pushed in the direction the fundamentals already pointed, at a moment when the market was ready to listen.
That is why I am sceptical whenever someone proposes a “new Plaza” for today’s imbalances. The 1985 conditions were specific: a currency that most economists agreed was in a bubble, five allies willing to act together, and a clear threat of protectionism if nothing was done. Take away any of those and the same words in a communiqué would probably move very little. The other lesson is about blame. It is tempting to explain a country’s long stagnation by a single foreign deal. In Japan’s case, the record points mainly to domestic choices made after the yen rose.
Sources
- Jeffrey Frankel, The Plaza Accord, 30 Years Later, NBER Working Paper 21813, December 2015 (accessed 4 Nov 2026)
- Edwin M. Truman, The Plaza Agreement: Exchange Rates and Policy Coordination, Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (accessed 4 Nov 2026)
- Wikipedia: Plaza Accord (accessed 4 Nov 2026)
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