Europe's First Currency Club: The Latin Monetary Union and the Fight Over Who Pays When It Ends
In 1865 France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland agreed to make their coins interchangeable, and Greece joined two years later. The Latin Monetary Union is often called a forerunner of the euro, but its most instructive moment came in 1885, when the members fought over who would have to buy back each other's silver coins if the club broke up. Analysis with a short opinion section. Not investment advice.
Long before the euro, a group of European countries tried to share money. On 23 December 1865 France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland signed a treaty that made their gold and silver coins interchangeable. It came into force on 1 August 1866, and the British press soon called it the “Latin Monetary Union”, partly to make clear that Britain was not joining (Wikipedia).
The union lasted, at least on paper, for about sixty years, and is often called a forerunner of the euro. The comparison only goes so far, but one lesson still matters: the hardest part of a shared currency is not starting it, it is agreeing on who pays if it ends.
A franc by any other name
The idea was simple. Each member kept its own currency name (the French and Swiss franc, the Belgian franc, the Italian lira, later the Greek drachma) but struck coins to the same weight and fineness. One unit meant 4.5 grams of fine silver or about 0.29 grams of fine gold, and gold and silver were tied at a fixed ratio of 15.5 to 1, inherited from the French system of 1803. The big silver five-franc piece was 0.900 fine, while the smaller silver coins were 0.835 fine (Wikipedia). A merchant in Lyon could take Italian or Belgian coins knowing they held the same metal as his own.
Others wanted in. Greece passed a law on 10 April 1867 declaring that it would use the treaty’s clause guaranteeing admission to any state that accepted its obligations. The drachma was set equal to the franc (Willis, 1901; Wikipedia: Modern drachma). Serbia, the Papal States and San Marino applied and were not accepted, while countries from Finland to Venezuela simply copied the standard without joining (Wikipedia).
The American economist Henry Parker Willis, who wrote the standard history of the union in 1901, was brutal about the Greek accession. He called Greece “economically unsound, convulsed by political struggles, and financially rotten”, noted that it was trying to keep “a large amount of inconvertible paper” in circulation, and concluded that it was “a mere useless appendage to the monetary league”, admitted for political rather than economic reasons (Willis, 1901). It is one historian’s view, but arguments about who is fit to join a currency club are clearly not new.
Paper money broke the rules from the start
The treaty only covered gold and silver coins. It said nothing binding about banknotes. Italy made its notes inconvertible legal tender (the cours forcé) on 1 May 1866, months before the treaty even came into force, and France later did the same during its own crisis years (Willis, 1901). Wikipedia, citing the Financial Times, describes this failure to control paper money as one of the union’s main weaknesses (Wikipedia).
Silver falls, and the coins become IOUs
The bigger shock came from the metals themselves. A fixed 15.5-to-1 ratio only works while the market agrees. In 1873 the value of silver dropped significantly. Germany moved to gold after unification: a law of 4 December 1871 created the gold mark, and Germany then sold off its old silver for years, until mounting losses forced a halt on 19 May 1879 (Wikipedia).
With silver cheap on the market but still worth 1/15.5 of gold at the union’s mints, it paid to bring silver in, have it struck into five-franc pieces and swap those for gold. The members reacted in stages. In Paris on 30 January 1874 they agreed to limit silver coinage, and by 1878 they suspended the minting of five-franc silver pieces altogether. From then on the union was in practice on gold. Willis wrote that the silver five-franc pieces were now “essentially upon the same footing as banknotes” (Wikipedia, quoting Willis, 1901).
That phrase is the key to what came next. A silver coin worth less than its face value is really a promise by the country that minted it. Every five-franc piece circulating in Paris but struck in Brussels or Rome was, in effect, a claim on Belgium or Italy.
1885: the liquidation clause
By 1884 France, which held large amounts of other members’ silver, wanted guarantees. In March 1884 the French government announced that the union would not be renewed unless provision was made for “liquidation”, meaning that if the union ended, each country would buy back its own silver coins held by the others. Switzerland gave formal notice to end the treaty, mainly to force a new conference, which finally met in Paris on 29 July 1885 (Willis, 1901).
Belgium refused. Its delegate, named by Willis as M. Pirmez, argued that the country which struck a coin should be “absolved from any responsibility as to the future value of the coin”, and warned that insisting on liquidation would break the union. The Italian delegate called that a quibble. The other members signed a new treaty on 6 November 1885 without Belgium and attached a protocol saying that, if Belgium stayed out, its five-franc pieces would be refused by the other members’ treasuries and banks of issue after three months. Willis called it “this declaration of monetary war” (Willis, 1901).
The compromise came on 12 December 1885 in an additional act. If the union dissolved and France held a balance of Belgian five-franc pieces, Belgium would redeem half directly, and the other half would be returned through the normal channels of trade, with Belgium promising not to pass laws that undermined this for five years. The same split was extended to Italy and, by declaration, to Greece. A separate declaration said Greece could not resume free coinage of silver while its cours forcé lasted (Willis, 1901).
A slow fade
After 1885 the union mostly stood still. The political turmoil that culminated in the First World War ended it in practice. It formally ended in the 1920s; sources give 1926 or 1927 (Wikipedia). Greece struck its last silver one- and two-drachma coins in 1911 (Wikipedia: Modern drachma). The last coins made to the union’s silver standard were Swiss half, one and two-franc pieces of 1967 (Wikipedia).
Did it help trade? A 2018 study in the European Review of Economic History, summarised on Wikipedia, found no significant effect on trade except in its first years, from 1865 to 1874 (Wikipedia).
Opinion: the exit bill is the real test
This is not investment advice.
I think the Latin Monetary Union is usually told as a story about bimetallism failing, and that is true. But the more useful story is 1885. A shared currency creates claims between members that nobody notices in good times. When the underlying value moved, those claims suddenly had a price, and the members discovered that the treaty had never said who would pay it. They nearly broke the union writing that rule after the fact.
The union also had, as Wikipedia notes, no common institutions (Wikipedia). There was no shared central bank, no common control of paper money, and no one with the authority to settle the dispute except the biggest member, France. The euro was designed differently, with a common central bank, so the 1885 problem cannot repeat in the same form. Still, I take a general lesson from it: any club that pools money should write down how losses are shared before it needs to, because the moment it needs to is the moment agreement is hardest.
The second lesson is humility about verdicts like Willis’s on Greece. Calling a member a “useless appendage” is easy. The record he himself describes shows that the real strains came from large members printing paper and from a world price that nobody controlled.
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