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Trump, Xi and Putin Meet as Three for the First Time. Can Nuclear Arms Control Survive Without a Treaty?

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Summary

On 19 November the leaders of the US, China and Russia hold their first three-way meeting, nine months after the last treaty capping US and Russian nuclear weapons expired. Why Washington wants China in, why Beijing keeps saying no, what Moscow is after, who is left outside the room, and what a realistic result would look like.

On Thursday 19 November, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin will sit down together. Beijing calls it the first trilateral summit of the three leaders and promises “in-depth exchanges on safeguarding world peace and promoting strategic stability in major-power relations”.

Behind that phrase sits a hard fact. Since 5 February 2026, for the first time in more than half a century, there is no treaty limiting the nuclear forces of the two largest nuclear powers. The question this week is whether three leaders can start to rebuild something, and whether a three-way treaty is even the right goal.

Three governments, three different meetings

The three capitals are not describing the same event. An analysis by the East Asia Institute in Seoul notes that the White House frames it as nuclear arms control after New START, Beijing avoids naming an agenda beyond “world peace” and “strategic stability”, and Russia, which first proposed the meeting in an October phone call, appears to see it as a step towards sanctions relief and out of isolation. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said on 17 November that the leaders may also discuss Ukraine, while ruling out any role for European governments in those talks.

The gap New START left

New START, signed in 2010, capped the US and Russia at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers each, and allowed up to 18 on-site inspections a year, as Al Jazeera summarises. Inspections had already stopped: Russia suspended data exchanges and inspections in early 2023 and the US followed, according to the IISS.

When the treaty expired, Moscow offered to keep observing its limits for another year if Washington did the same. Trump did not accept and called for a “new, improved and modernised” treaty. Even so, the IISS found in May that neither side had moved above the old limits. What stands between the two arsenals now is informal, unverified restraint.

Why Washington wants China at the table

The American argument is simple: a two-party treaty no longer matches the world. “Arms control can no longer be a bilateral issue between the United States and Russia,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio wrote in February. Under Secretary Thomas DiNanno told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that China was “on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030” and that its arsenal had “no limits, no transparency, no declarations, and no controls”.

Independent estimates confirm fast growth, if not the US projection itself. SIPRI estimates China’s arsenal rose from about 600 warheads in January 2025 to about 620 in January 2026, and expects it to keep growing for a decade. Al Jazeera, citing SIPRI, reports growth of about 100 warheads a year since 2023.

Washington also accused China of a secret low-yield nuclear test near Lop Nur on 22 June 2020. China’s ambassador in Vienna rejected this as unfounded, and the global test-ban monitoring network says it recorded no matching event. The Norwegian seismic institute NORSAR reviewed regional data after the claim was made. The allegation remains disputed, and no public evidence settles it either way.

Why Beijing keeps saying no

China’s first answer is arithmetic. The Council on Foreign Relations puts China’s stockpile at roughly 600 warheads, against about 3,700 for the US and 4,400 for Russia. Beijing calls it “neither fair, reasonable nor realistic” to be asked to join limits designed for arsenals several times larger.

There are deeper reasons, and they are not just excuses. CFR’s analysts list four:

Chinese scholars quoted by Al Jazeera add two more points. Sun Chenghao of Tsinghua University says China also weighs US missile defences and precision-strike weapons that could weaken its retaliation. Zhao Minghao of Fudan University points to a “credibility problem”: the US left the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019.

Beijing does have its own proposal. Since 2024 it has pushed for a treaty in which the five recognised nuclear powers promise never to use nuclear weapons first against one another. Washington has rejected no-first-use: the 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review said it would carry “an unacceptable level of risk”, CFR notes.

On the other side, outside analysts point out that China’s position keeps shifting. In 1982 Beijing said the superpowers must halve their arsenals first; the US stockpile has since fallen by more than 80 percent, and China still asks for “drastic” cuts. Alejandro Reyes of the University of Hong Kong told Al Jazeera that China’s build-up raises “legitimate questions about where Beijing intends to stop”.

What Moscow wants, and who is outside

Russia says any multilateral deal must eventually include the British and French arsenals, since they are part of NATO’s deterrent. In Geneva in February, Britain answered that talks should focus on the largest arsenals; France said reducing nuclear risk should be the goal of every nuclear-armed state, as AFP reported.

Then there is everyone who is not invited. Europeans and Ukrainians fear a “Yalta 2.0”, with big powers deciding their security over their heads. In India, commentators worry that rules for Asia’s nuclear balance could be written without New Delhi. Seoul’s EAI notes that North Korea’s programme is absent from the agenda. And most of the world’s states, which have no nuclear weapons, watched the NPT Review Conference fail again in May, the third time in a row without a consensus document. For them, the nuclear powers’ promise under the NPT to disarm is the bargain that made giving up the bomb acceptable.

Does arms control even work?

It is worth not assuming the answer. The world’s nuclear inventory fell from about 70,300 warheads in 1986 to roughly 12,300 at the start of 2026, according to the Federation of American Scientists (SIPRI’s estimate is 12,187). But FAS itself warns that most of that fall happened in the 1990s, after the Cold War ended, and that governments often give treaties more credit than they deserve. Sceptics also note that treaties can collapse, as the INF Treaty did amid accusations of Russian violations.

The stronger case for treaties is less about numbers than about knowledge: data exchanges and inspections let each side see the other’s forces, so neither has to plan for the worst. That is exactly what has been missing since 2023. SIPRI now expects the long decline in global stockpiles to reverse in the coming years.

What a realistic result looks like

Almost nobody expects a treaty in Shenzhen. Experts quoted by Defense News see three plausible outcomes:

  1. A restated principle: a repeat of the line that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, which all five recognised nuclear powers already signed in January 2022.
  2. A pledge on artificial intelligence: that humans, not machines, decide on nuclear use. Biden and Xi agreed this in 2024; Russia has resisted such wording so far.
  3. Small risk-reduction steps, such as advance notice of missile launches, which CFR suggests; China gave only a couple of hours’ warning before one test this year.

The fourth scenario, a real start to three-way talks with a working group and a date, is possible but would need Beijing to move further than it has signalled.

Opinion: aim lower, and aim at transparency

I don’t think a three-way numbers treaty is coming soon, and I don’t think it is the right first ask. Demanding that China join limits built for arsenals roughly six times larger gives Beijing an easy reason to refuse. But China’s position also has a weak spot: if its build-up is purely defensive, it can say roughly where it intends to stop.

The most useful thing Shenzhen could produce is boring: a written commitment by the US and Russia to keep the old New START limits in place while they talk, a shared pledge on human control of nuclear launch decisions, and launch notifications that include China. None of that ends an arms race. All of it makes an accident less likely.

And whatever the three agree, they owe the rest of the world more than a handshake. Most countries gave up the option of the bomb in exchange for a promise that the nuclear powers would disarm. If three men can meet in Shenzhen, they can also say what they will do about that promise.

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