Five EU Countries Plan a Deportation Hub in Rwanda. Can It Close Europe's Return Gap?
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands want to send people with final deportation orders to Rwanda from 2027. What the plan actually says, why governments want it, why Kigali agreed, and what Britain, Israel and Italy learned from similar schemes.
On 16 November, in Vienna, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands announced that they want to open a “return hub” in Rwanda. People who have lost their asylum case in one of those five countries, and whom no one has managed to send home, would be flown to Kigali instead. The first transfers are planned for 2027.
It sounds like a rerun of Britain’s failed Rwanda scheme. It is not quite that, and the differences matter. But the old questions have not gone away: is it legal, will it work, who pays, and what does Rwanda get?
What has actually been agreed
Less than the headlines suggest. The Danish and Greek governments both describe the five countries and Rwanda as “jointly exploring” a hub. Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said “technical things” still had to be sorted out, but “the framework, the idea and the partnership is now in place.”
What is known so far:
- Who goes: only people with an enforceable return decision after a full asylum procedure, in other words people the courts have already found have no right to protection or to stay. Unaccompanied minors are excluded by EU law, and in the first phase the countries say they will send only single men.
- Which ones: each country picks its own. According to Euronews, the Netherlands will focus on men from countries near Rwanda, and Germany on people who refuse to help establish their identity or whose home states will not take them back.
- How big: a pilot of about 100 people at a time. Diplomatic sources told AFP, as reported by the BBC, that each country might send around 20.
- What happens there: an open, temporary facility, not a camp with fences. Afterwards people can stay in Rwanda with a residence permit, work and access to schools and healthcare, or go back to their own country, or to any country that will admit them.
- Who pays: the five countries, in full. No figure has been published.
The legal door was opened by the EU’s new Return Regulation, adopted by the Council on 1 October 2026, which for the first time lets member states send people to hubs in non-EU countries, but only countries that respect human rights and the rule against sending anyone to a place where they face persecution (non-refoulement).
Why governments want it: the return gap
The core problem is a number. In 2025, according to Eurostat, 491,950 people were ordered to leave the EU, and 135,460 were returned to a country outside it. The two figures do not track the same people year by year, but the order of magnitude is clear: most deportation orders are never carried out.
Part of the reason sits in the countries of origin. Research by the Migration Policy Institute shows that many states delay or refuse to identify and readmit their own citizens. They have reasons that are not just obstinacy: remittances from emigrants are a real part of their economies, forced returns are unpopular at home, and they see no reason to do Europe’s enforcement for it. A person who will not say where he is from, from a country that will not confirm it, cannot be deported anywhere. The hub is meant to be the “somewhere” for exactly these cases.
The governments also argue that it is about trust. “If people without the right of residence in the EU cannot be removed, our entire asylum system is made a mockery of,” said Austrian Chancellor Christian Stocker. Greece’s migration minister Thanos Plevris, whose country is one of the EU’s main entry points, presented the hub as a way to close the gap in enforcing return decisions and to hit the business model of smugglers. Frederiksen turned the human rights argument around: the current system, she said, rewards those strong and rich enough to reach Europe, while “some of those who are most fragile” in refugee camps never get the chance.
Europe is not united on it. Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said the plan had no “future or humanity”, while Britain, which abandoned its own Rwanda deal, said it would watch “with interest” (BBC). Still, the goal itself is not a fringe position. Even the UN refugee agency’s head, Barham Salih, who attended the Vienna meeting, said that “prompt and humane return arrangements” for people without a right to stay are essential to public trust in asylum. UNHCR offered to advise, while also asking Europe for more resettlement and legal routes in return.
Why Rwanda said yes
It is easy to describe Kigali as simply selling a service. Its own account is different. Rwanda says it already hosts more than 150,000 refugees, and since 2019 it has run an Emergency Transit Mechanism with UNHCR and the African Union for people evacuated from Libyan detention: more than 3,000 have passed through, and by August 2026, according to Xinhua, 2,681 had been resettled, mostly in Canada, Europe and the US. Rwanda’s minister Vincent Biruta asked Europe to “go beyond the existing cliché” and promised independent monitoring: “Everyone will be welcome to witness and monitor what’s happening.” He said the funded training and job programmes would also benefit Rwandans.
There is also diplomacy. Rwanda already agreed in 2025 to take up to 250 deportees from the United States. Being useful to Washington and five EU governments buys goodwill at a time when Kigali is accused, including by Human Rights Watch, of backing armed rebels in neighbouring Congo. Human Rights Watch’s researcher Clementine de Montjoye warned that paying Kigali would “provide political leverage to a government responsible for serious human rights abuses at home and abroad.”
Not all of Africa sees it Rwanda’s way. In 2025 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights condemned the trend of non-African states transferring migrants to Africa, and analysts at South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies argue the new EU rules push Europe’s unsolved problems onto African states through opaque deals.
What earlier schemes teach
Britain. The UK planned to send asylum seekers to Rwanda before their claims were decided. In November 2023 its Supreme Court ruled the plan unlawful because Rwanda might send people on to danger. No one was deported; four people went voluntarily, and the new government said in 2024 the scheme had cost about £700 million. The EU plan is designed around that ruling: it only covers people whose claims have already been rejected in Europe.
Israel. From late 2013 to 2017 nearly 4,000 Eritreans and Sudanese left Israel for Rwanda and Uganda under secret “voluntary departure” deals, often as the alternative to detention. Researchers who interviewed 19 of them in Germany and the Netherlands found they were not given protection and moved on through South Sudan, Sudan and Libya to the Mediterranean. Sixteen eventually got refugee status in Europe. A small sample, but a warning: an “open” facility can mean people leave and come back by the most dangerous route.
Italy. Rome’s centres in Albania, now used to detain people awaiting deportation, carried out 59 repatriations in 2025 at an estimated €68,000 each, according to ANSA.
Will it deter anyone?
That is the claim made most confidently and backed least. Frederiksen argues that if people stop assuming they can stay, many will not try. Critics reply, in the words of Human Rights Watch’s Judith Sunderland, that if the risk of dying in the desert, being tortured in Libya or drowning at sea does not deter people, a chance of being sent to Rwanda probably will not. The closest real test, Australia’s offshore processing, is disputed: the Kaldor Centre at the University of New South Wales, a centre critical of the policy, concludes that boat arrivals fell mainly after the navy started turning boats back, not because of the offshore camps. Australian governments have argued the reverse, calling regional processing a key pillar of their border policy. With about 100 places, against nearly half a million return orders issued across the EU in 2025, the Rwanda pilot is too small to deter by numbers; it can only work as a signal.
Opinion: a small, honest test is better than a big promise
I don’t think the people this hub targets are the most sympathetic cases in the asylum system, and I don’t think governments are lying when they say an asylum system nobody can enforce loses public consent. When that consent collapses, the people who lose most are the ones who genuinely need protection, including women and children. That is a real argument, and it deserves a real answer, not the word “shame”.
But I see three risks. First, the Israeli precedent: if people leave the “open” facility and head north again through Sudan and Libya, Europe has not solved anything; it has moved the danger to where it can’t be seen. Second, leverage: a state that hosts Europe’s deportees gains a quiet veto over Europe’s criticism of it, whether about Congo or about dissidents. Third, the selection: men picked for “non-cooperation” are a group about whom few voters will ask questions, which is exactly why independent monitoring must be real.
What would convince me: published costs per person, independent monitors with unannounced access, and honest data in 2028 on how many of those sent stayed, went home, or reappeared on the Mediterranean. If the five governments publish that, this is a policy experiment. If they don’t, it is a press conference.
Sources
- Government of the Netherlands: The Netherlands and European partners working with Rwanda to establish a return hub (16/11/2026)
- POLITICO Europe: 5 countries announce plan to deport failed asylum-seekers to Rwanda
- BBC News: Five EU countries announce migrant deportation centre in Rwanda
- Euronews: Five EU countries unveil Rwanda deportation plan in migration crackdown
- UNHCR statement on the High Commissioner's participation in the Vienna meeting
- Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum: Minister Plevris in Vienna on the Rwanda return hub
- Council of the EU: Council adopts new rules on return (1/10/2026)
- Eurostat: Enforcement of immigration legislation statistics
- Reuters: Explainer - What is the UK's Rwanda migrant deportation bill?
- The Guardian: Failed Rwanda deportation scheme cost £700m, says Yvette Cooper
- Oxford Law Blogs (Border Criminologies): Moving under Threats - refugees who 'voluntarily' departed from Israel to Rwanda and Uganda
- ANSA: 59 repatriations from Albanian detention centres in 2025, each costing 68,000 euros
- African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Resolution 645 on externalisation of migration governance (2025)
- ISS Africa: EU Return Regulation outsources migration problems to Africa
- AP News: Rwanda accepts up to 250 deportees from the US under Trump's third-country plan
- Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration: Rwanda and five EU Member States jointly exploring a return hub
- Migration Policy Institute: 'Recalcitrant' and 'Uncooperative' - why some countries refuse to accept return of their deportees
- Kaldor Centre (UNSW): Cruel, costly and ineffective - the failure of offshore processing in Australia
- KT Press: Rwanda has received more than 3,000 asylum seekers evacuated from Libya since 2019
- Xinhua: Rwanda receives 177 asylum seekers evacuated from Libya
- Australian Minister for Home Affairs: New agreement to secure our region from maritime people smuggling
- IGIHE: Rwanda migrant return hub plan to offer skills and jobs to migrants and locals - Biruta
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