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Spain Tracks 4,000 Abusers With GPS Bracelets. Can a Bracelet Keep a Woman Alive?

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Summary

EU prosecutors are investigating possible fraud in the contract for Spain's anti-abuser bracelets. The bigger question is what these devices can and cannot do: the evidence, the failures, and why most murdered women never reach the system at all.

On 12 November, officers of Spain’s Guardia Civil walked into the Ministry of Equality and the national Court of Auditors in Madrid. They were acting for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is investigating possible fraud involving EU money used to buy the electronic bracelets that track men under restraining orders for gender violence. The ministry says it was a request for documents, not a raid, and the minister says she is confident the money was spent correctly. No one has been named and nothing has been proven.

The fraud question will be settled by investigators. The question that matters to the women wearing the other half of the system is older and harder: what does a GPS bracelet actually do, and when does it fail?

How the system works

Spain’s system, called COMETA, has run since 2009. A man under a court order wears a bracelet; the woman he must stay away from carries a separate tracking unit. A control room watches both. If he enters a forbidden zone, tampers with the device or the signal drops, an alarm goes to operators, who warn the woman and call the police. According to the Delegate for Gender Violence, the system processes around 30 million location points a day, and the ministry reports roughly 74,800 alerts a month.

The scale has grown. In June 2026 there were 4,021 tracked men and 4,700 protected women, up from 3,763 and 4,056 two years earlier, and close to 24,000 bracelets have been fitted since 2009. Spain’s model has spread: the French parliament explicitly cited it when it created its own “anti-approach bracelet” in 2019, and in April 2025 Brazil amended its Maria da Penha Law so judges can add electronic monitoring of the aggressor, with an alert device for the victim, to urgent protective orders.

What went wrong

In late 2023 the service moved from one contractor (Telefónica, subcontracting Securitas Direct) to a joint venture of Vodafone and Securitas, under a €42.6 million contract. The old providers had not even bid, so the market for this service was thin. Data did not transfer properly. For months, courts could not get the location history of tracked men from before 20 March 2024. Spain’s state prosecutor wrote in its annual report that this caused “a large number” of provisional dismissals and acquittals in cases of breached restraining orders. Under fire, prosecutors softened that: acquittals were “minimal”, the devices kept working, and the minister said only 1% of requests for older data could not be met.

The Court of Auditors’ Report 1,695, approved in September 2026, is less forgiving. It counted 123 court requests that could not be answered, and found “serious deficiencies during practically the entire term” of the 2023 contract: unreliable devices, service interruptions, geolocation errors “that allowed aggressors to approach victims”, batteries lasting about a week and a half instead of the six months promised, and slow repairs. These were not one-off glitches: the auditors note that the contractor itself acknowledged them, and the control-room staff had warned of the risk. The ministry imposed a penalty in only one case. The auditors also found that no transition plan had been written into the earlier contracts at all, and that contracts were rushed through urgent procedures for a renewal that everyone knew was coming.

None of this was secret. Público counted 13 warnings from the state prosecutor since 2009: poor coverage in rural areas, the difficulty of a 500-metre exclusion zone in a small village, technicians who take hours to arrive, and repeated false alerts that left some women so anxious they asked courts to remove the devices.

In May 2026 the ministry awarded the new contract to the same Vodafone-Securitas venture, with a value of up to €111 million including extensions. The ministry says the service now runs without relevant incidents.

Does it save lives?

Spanish officials repeat one line: no woman carrying a COMETA device has ever been killed. Prosecutors have said the same in their reports. It is a striking record, but it is not proof by itself, for three reasons.

First, selection. Bracelets go to cases a judge has already identified, where the man is known and watched. Second, the system works alongside police risk assessment and protection, so its separate effect is hard to isolate. Third, the record can break. Uruguay, which has used ankle monitors since 2013 and once made the same claim, saw its first femicide by a man in the programme in August 2024. He had broken his device four months earlier and was wanted by police; the woman had declined police protection, as many do because of the stigma and the disruption to work and family life.

The research outside Spain is mixed. A study for the US National Institute of Justice across three sites found that men on GPS made practically no contact attempts while tracked, and at two sites were less likely to be rearrested in the following year; at the third there was no effect. A later quasi-experimental study found GPS no better than ordinary supervision at preventing rearrest. The honest summary is that tracking seems to deter many men while it is on, and nobody has shown a lasting change once it comes off.

France offers the cautionary tale of a weak rollout. Its bracelet was launched in nine months, during the pandemic, with no extra staff, and researchers found judges and probation services still saw it as obscure and heavy to manage. In November 2025 only 661 were active, against more than 4,000 in Spain, which has fewer people. Part of the reason is that in France the man must consent before trial; if he refuses, the court has to find another measure.

The women the bracelet never reaches

The most important number is not in the bracelet statistics. Spain’s official count shows 48 women killed by partners or ex-partners in 2025. Only 11 had ever filed a complaint, and in just four cases was a restraining order in force and broken. More than three quarters of the murdered women were never in the system at all. In France, by contrast, the Fondation des femmes says 47% of women killed in 2024 had alerted the authorities, which says as much about a protection gap after reporting as about reporting itself.

So the bracelet answers a narrow question well: how to enforce a court order against a man the state already knows is dangerous. It cannot help a woman who has not reported, whose risk was underrated, or whose abuser is willing to cut the strap and accept prison.

The other side

There are real arguments against wider use. Many bracelets are fitted before trial, on men who have not been convicted, which raises presumption-of-innocence concerns that courts in every country have to weigh. The burden also falls on the victim: she must carry a charged device, answer calls, and live with false alarms. And money spent on a technology contract is money not spent on shelters, specialised police and courts. French campaigners estimate that properly funding the response to domestic violence would need ten times what the state spends. For poorer countries the trade-off is sharper still: a 24-hour control room, network coverage and fast police response are luxuries.

Opinion: The bracelet is only as strong as the contract behind it

I think the bracelet is one of the few tools that turns a court’s words into something enforceable in real time, and Spain’s numbers suggest it works for the men it watches. But a protection system is not a product you buy once. For most of the last contract, women in Spain were relying on batteries that died in days and locations that could be wrong, while the ministry imposed a single penalty and then gave the same contractor a bigger deal. Officials had real constraints, a thin market and a service that could not be switched off for a day, but those constraints are exactly why supervision had to be tougher, not softer. Whatever European prosecutors find about the money, that is already a failure of supervision, and it was documented by the state’s own auditors.

The lesson for every country building or renewing such a system, from Brazil to Greece, is plain. Write a transition plan before the first contract, fine failures quickly, publish failure rates every month next to the alarm counts, and ask the control-room staff what they see. And remember that three in four murdered women in Spain never reached the system. The bracelet protects the women we already know about. The harder work is finding the rest.

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