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Eastern Libya Just Backed Turkey's Sea Deal South of Crete. What Actually Changes?

A small survey ship on a calm deep-blue sea at dusk, with a rugged mountainous island silhouetted against an orange and violet sky
Summary

On 20 October Libya's eastern parliament ratified the 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum that Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and the EU call void. Legally, little changes for third countries. Politically, a lot does. Here are the competing arguments, the motives of each side, and the realistic scenarios.

On 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives voted unanimously to approve a document it had loudly rejected six years earlier: the 2019 memorandum between Turkey and the then Tripoli government that draws a maritime boundary between the two countries across the eastern Mediterranean. The same session repealed the parliament’s 2020 decisions refusing ratification and cutting political ties with Ankara.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called it “extremely pleasing news”. Greece called the memorandum “illegal, null and void”. Egypt said the ratification has “no legal effect” for Cairo, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the EU “deeply regretted” it. So what has actually changed, and for whom?

What the 2019 memorandum does

Every coastal state can claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf of up to 200 nautical miles, with rights over fish, oil and gas. In a crowded sea these claims overlap, so neighbours must draw lines by agreement or in court.

The Turkey-Libya memorandum, signed in Istanbul on 27 November 2019 and registered with the UN that December, draws a short shared boundary between a Turkish zone and a Libyan zone, roughly south-east of Crete. To do that, it treats the large Greek islands in between, above all Crete (about 9,000 square kilometres and some 635,000 residents, according to legal scholar Constantinos Yiallourides), as if they had little or no sea of their own beyond the coast.

Turkey’s case. Ankara argues that delimitation must produce an equitable result, not a mechanical median line. In its own words, islands “cannot have a cut-off effect” on the coast of the country with the longest mainland coastline in the eastern Mediterranean, islands “on the wrong side of the median line between two mainlands” should get only territorial waters, and the length and direction of coasts must count. Its favourite example is Kastellorizo, a tiny Greek island off the Turkish coast that would, Ankara says, generate a zone 4,000 times its own size. Libya’s Tripoli government made a similar case at the UN in 2025, proposing a mainland-to-mainland line with Greece and calling the 2020 Greece-Egypt agreement void.

The case of Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and the EU. Athens replies that Turkey and Libya have no opposite or adjacent coasts at all, because Crete sits between them, so there is nothing for them to delimit. Islands are entitled to full maritime zones under Article 121 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Greece says this rule is also customary law. That matters, because Turkey is not a party to UNCLOS and Libya has signed but not ratified it. A treaty between two states also cannot take away rights of a third one.

Courts and tribunals have treated islands in very different ways: some got full effect, tiny rocks were often ignored, and in the 1985 Libya/Malta case the island state got less sea than a pure median line would give. But Yiallourides also notes that Crete and Rhodes are not tiny uninhabited rocks, and the case for ignoring them altogether is much weaker than the case for reducing their effect. In its 2020 partial deal with Egypt, Greece itself accepted a line that gave Crete less than full effect. The real legal fight is over how much effect Crete deserves, not whether it has any.

Why eastern Libya changed its mind

In 2019-20, Turkish drones and advisers stopped Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces from taking Tripoli, and his camp called Turkey an occupier. Analysts point to three changes since. First, Haftar’s older patrons have weakened: Russia is consumed by the war in Ukraine, which the OSW Centre for Eastern Studies says has reduced its capacity to back him. Second, Haftar, now in his 80s, is preparing a family succession, and Turkish recognition helps legitimise it; his son Saddam has led the contacts with Ankara. Third, Turkey has offered something concrete: training, and in July a deal on military facilities and surveillance systems. The Stimson Center described the ratification as the “prize” Haftar could offer in return.

Libyan lawmakers frame it as national interest. One, Tarek al-Jeroushi, said “some countries may be upset by this agreement, but what matters to us is our national interest.” That is not just a pretext. The memorandum gives Libya a wider claimed zone than a median line with Crete would, and the rival Tripoli government, which signed it, welcomed the vote. Libya’s two camps agree on very little, but now they agree on this.

What changes, and what does not

Legally, for Greece, Egypt and Cyprus: almost nothing. A bilateral deal cannot bind third states, and all three, plus the EU, have rejected it from the start.

Politically: quite a lot. Until now Athens could hope that a future Libyan government would drop the memorandum, since the elected parliament had refused it. That hope is now much weaker. Greece has spent two years courting both halves of Libya: the foreign minister visited Benghazi twice, Saddam Haftar came to Athens in June, and three rounds of technical talks on an EEZ were held with Tripoli, the last in July. The vote shows the limits of that strategy against what Turkey could offer militarily.

Egypt is the other loser, and a revealing one. In July, Al Jazeera’s sources claimed Cairo had quietly stopped objecting to a Benghazi-Ankara line as Egypt and Turkey mended ties; that claim was never confirmed. This week Egypt’s foreign ministry called the memorandum “absolutely void” and said it infringes Egypt’s own zone. Whatever was said privately, Cairo’s public line has not moved.

On the water: it depends on what happens next. Chevron and Greece’s Helleniq Energy signed leases for blocks south of Crete in February 2026, and seismic surveys were expected to start around the end of 2026. Libya objected to those blocks at the UN in 2025; Greece replied that their outer edge follows the median line with Libya.

Four scenarios

  1. Paper war. Protest notes and UN letters, with no one acting at sea. This has been the pattern since 2019 and remains the most likely.
  2. A standoff at sea. If Turkey or Libya licenses or surveys inside the area Greece claims, or harasses Chevron’s survey ships, we could see a repeat of 2020, when a Turkish survey standoff ended in a minor collision between two frigates.
  3. Negotiation. Greece and Libya keep talking and agree a line in which Crete gets reduced but real effect, as in the Greece-Egypt deal. Libya would have to accept partly overriding its memorandum with Turkey, which is hard right after ratifying it.
  4. A court. Greece’s stated position is to take disputes with Turkey to the International Court of Justice, but Turkey does not accept the court’s compulsory jurisdiction and refused to appear when Greece went alone in 1976. A case needs a special agreement both sides sign.

Opinion: Greece’s real problem is leverage, not only law

My view is that Greece has the stronger legal argument: a line that treats Crete as if it barely exists is hard to defend, though courts can surprise. But eastern Libya made a cold calculation. Turkey offered training, military facilities and recognition; Athens offered goodwill, migration cooperation and a voice in the EU.

The obvious answer is for Greece to make Libya a serious offer, a line where Crete is not ignored but not maximised either. The honest counter-argument is that Athens fears exactly that: every concession on how much sea an island gets could be quoted back by Turkey in the far bigger Aegean dispute. That fear is real. Still, Greece already accepted reduced effect for Crete with Egypt without the sky falling. Waiting for a court that one side refuses to enter is not a strategy.

Sources

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