Yemen's War Is Back. Why Can't Saudi Arabia Stop the Houthis?
The 2022 truce in Yemen is dead. Houthi missiles hit Riyadh's airport, Saudi oil sites and, on 19 October, a police training camp in Shabwa where at least 53 recruits died. This explainer covers how the truce collapsed, why one of the world's best-armed states cannot simply shoot down or bomb out a poorer enemy, what each side says it wants, who else is being pulled in, from Egypt and Pakistan to China and India, what it costs Yemeni civilians and the wider world, three ways it could go, and my view.
On 19 October three ballistic missiles fired by Yemen’s Houthis struck a training centre for police and internal security recruits near Ataq, in Shabwa province. Local authorities counted at least 53 dead and more than 200 wounded; a later Reuters report put the toll at 58. The Houthis said they had hit “Saudi enemy concentrations”; Yemen’s government called it a war crime. Saudi Arabia then postponed its flagship investment conference to 2027 and told Riyadh government staff to work from home.
Saudi Arabia has far more money, jets and air defences. Why can’t it stop the Houthis?
How the truce died
The Saudi-Houthi truce of April 2022 largely held until July, when, as the Guardian and CNN report, Saudi jets bombed the runway at Sanaa airport to stop an Iranian plane bringing a Houthi delegation home from the funeral of Iran’s supreme leader, killed in the US-Israeli war on Iran. Riyadh said a charter plane could land, but not an Iranian one. The Houthis promised “a siege for a siege”, declared a naval blockade of Saudi shipping and fired at Saudi oil sites.
In September they pushed down the Red Sea coast and by 16 September held the town of Mocha and small islands at the Bab al-Mandab strait. In October Saudi-backed forces counterattacked with heavy Saudi air support, and Houthi missiles and drones answered across the kingdom: an attack on Riyadh’s main airport on 10 October killed 12 people and wounded 309. Tallies of all deaths inside the kingdom range from at least 18 to at least 20, depending on the outlet.
Why the missile shield leaks
Saudi Arabia operates US-made Patriot and THAAD systems. Analysts quoted by Al Jazeera, Middle East Eye and the Stimson Center give four reasons they cannot stop everything:
- Geography. The attacker picks one target; the defender must cover airports, cities, oil fields and bases across a vast desert.
- Mixed weapons. Low-flying drones and cruise missiles leave little warning time, and systems built for ballistic missiles handle them less well.
- Stocks. Patriot and THAAD interceptors were used up quickly in the early months of the Iran war, and Riyadh has asked friends for help.
- Cost. Firing expensive interceptors at cheap drones is ruinous over a long campaign.
Two cautions. Stimson finds no public evidence that shortages caused the airport hits, and some damage comes from intercept debris. Nawaf Obaid of King’s College London says dozens of attacks are stopped for each one that gets through and that the coalition still has the military upper hand. The Houthis have limits too: analyst Wolfgang Pusztai believes they have few short-range ballistic missiles left, so they may aim single missiles at softer targets.
Why bombing has not settled it before
Saudi Arabia tried air power from 2015 to 2022. A UN Development Programme model estimated 377,000 deaths by the end of 2021, nearly 60% of them from hunger, disease and lost healthcare, and nearly 70% of them children under five. The Houthis still held Sanaa.
Stimson explains why: the movement fought six wars against the state from 2004 to 2010, took Sanaa in 2014 with the army’s weapons, and lives on taxes, customs and fuel revenue. Strikes work only if losses outpace replacement, and civilian deaths feed the Houthi story of resisting invasion.
Pressure is not useless, though. Ahmed Nagi of the International Crisis Group told the Washington Post that the current strikes hurt the Houthis more than they admit. And the 50-day US bombing campaign of spring 2025 ended with a US-Houthi deal: the Houthis stopped targeting US ships, though the deal excluded Israel.
Riyadh’s weak ground hand
Saudi Arabia’s bigger problem is on the ground. It broke with the United Arab Emirates late last year over Abu Dhabi’s support for southern separatists, and the UAE left Yemen in January. Fighters once under Emirati command told CNN the Saudis never replaced that command structure. The anti-Houthi camp, from government troops and Islah to Tareq Saleh’s forces and southern separatists, disagrees about who should rule Yemen. Air power can retake a coastline; holding it needs a trusted government.
What each side says it wants
The Houthis’ chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, says Sanaa asked Riyadh to lift the blockade of its ports and airport and settle humanitarian issues under the UN roadmap of December 2023, which promised a ceasefire and payment of public salaries. He says Sanaa accepted an Omani proposal for a five-day truce and the Saudi reply came 21 days later, as fighting began. That is his account, carried by an Iran-linked news agency.
Saudi deputy minister Rayed Krimly says Iran encouraged the escalation to gain leverage in its own war with the US. Yemeni government officials point to the Houthi siege of Taiz, home to nearly a million people. A report in Lebanon’s Al Akhbar, relayed by the Jerusalem Post, said in September that Riyadh offered a two-week ceasefire through Oman; Riyadh has not confirmed it, so treat it as unconfirmed.
Stimson’s reading sits between: Iran supplies technology and gains leverage, but the Houthis have their own leaders and goals and are not simple proxies.
Who else is being pulled in
The United States has refused Saudi requests to strike the Houthis, guarding its 2025 deal before the midterms, though over 100 US advisers help with intelligence and targeting. Egypt offers air and missile defence only; its parliament delays the vote to 26 October and needs a two-thirds majority. Cairo’s reasons: its foreign minister says the Suez Canal has lost about $11 billion since 2023, millions of Egyptians work in Saudi Arabia, and Nasser’s costly 1960s war in Yemen argues for defending the kingdom without entering Yemen. Turkey and Pakistan have activated their August Mecca defence pact with Riyadh, and France and Britain are giving limited support.
Further away, the stakes are economic. Brent crude was about $110 a barrel on 20 October, near a five-month high. India, with about 2.74 million citizens in Saudi Arabia, called attacks on civilian airports “completely unacceptable”. China condemned attacks on airports and energy sites at the UN, said “resorting to force is not the right approach” and backed the UN envoy. A Yemeni official’s claim that Russia and China back the Houthis fits poorly with that, and I found no evidence for it in my sources.
The people who pay
Yemen’s 2026 aid plan says 22.3 million people need help; by late August it was only 20.2% funded. China’s envoy told the UN that about 200,000 people have been displaced since September. Civilians in Saudi Arabia are now targets too: an Egyptian resident was among those killed at Riyadh’s airport.
Three ways this could go
- A grinding war. Saudi-backed forces retake parts of the coast, but missiles keep coming from the mountains. Several analysts quoted here expect this.
- A deal linked to Iran. If the US-Iran war calms, Oman could revive the 2023 roadmap. Without that, Tehran keeps an incentive to let Riyadh bleed.
- A wider war. Egyptian, Pakistani or Turkish deployments become targets, and shipping suffers further.
My view
Saudi Arabia has a real case: no state can accept missiles on its airports, and an armed movement holding a world chokepoint endangers more than Yemen. The Houthis also have a real grievance in the blockade and unpaid salaries. Neither justifies killing recruits in a police camp or passengers in an airport, nor the civilian toll of strikes on Yemen.
The evidence from 2015 to 2022 suggests that pressure can change the terms but cannot end this war. The way out is the deal already written in 2023, opened ports, paid salaries and a ceasefire, plus a Yemeni government able to hold what it retakes. Every month of delay adds children to the UN’s tally.
Sources
- BBC: Houthi missile strike on Yemen camp kills 50 security recruits, local authorities say (19 Oct 2026)
- Yemen Monitor: Shabwa authorities say 53 recruits killed and 200 injured (20 Oct 2026)
- CNBC/Reuters: Brent crude holds near five-month high on Middle East tension (20 Oct 2026)
- Al Jazeera: Saudi Arabia cancels 2026 'Davos in the Desert' amid Houthi attacks (20 Oct 2026)
- The Guardian: Yemen civil war, what sparked the latest escalation and who is involved? (7 Oct 2026)
- CNN: How a series of miscalculations restarted Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen (10 Oct 2026)
- Al Jazeera: Why are Houthi missiles breaking through Saudi Arabia's air defences? (11 Oct 2026)
- Stimson Center: Why Saudi military superiority has not defeated the Houthis (13 Oct 2026)
- Middle East Eye: Why have Saudi air defences failed to intercept Houthi missiles? (15 Oct 2026)
- The Washington Post: As Iran war spills over, Saudis and Houthis see fighting as only path ahead (18 Oct 2026)
- Al Arabiya: Iran is backing and encouraging escalated Houthi attacks, senior Saudi diplomat says (16 Oct 2026)
- ABNA: Sanaa negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam's statement on talks with Saudi Arabia (19 Oct 2026)
- The Jerusalem Post: Saudi Arabia reportedly seeking two-week ceasefire, talks with Houthis (18 Sep 2026)
- Al Jazeera: What help can Egypt offer Saudi Arabia in the war against the Houthis? (18 Oct 2026)
- Dawn: Egypt delays vote on military support for Saudi Arabia until October 26
- Permanent Mission of China to the UN: Remarks by Ambassador Fu Cong on Yemen (9 Oct 2026)
- The Indian Express: India condemns Houthi attacks on Saudi airports, issues advisory (9 Oct 2026)
- UNDP: Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen, Pathways for Recovery (2021)
- OCHA: Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026
- ReliefWeb: Yemen Humanitarian Response Snapshot, August 2026
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