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Why the Strait of Hormuz Still Matters When Ships Sink There

Illustration of cargo ships and tankers crossing a narrow sea channel between two arid coastlines at dusk
Summary

Two cargo ships sank near the Strait of Hormuz this week, the second and third vessels lost in the region since the Iran war began in February. Neither was an oil tanker, and a wreck does not block the channel. So why does it matter so much? Because Hormuz normally carries about a fifth of the world's oil consumption and a fifth of its LNG trade, the bypass pipelines can carry only a fraction of that, and what closes a strait is risk, not wreckage. Explainer with a short opinion section.

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On Tuesday, 13 October, the Singapore-registered container ship GFS Pride was hit while crossing the Strait of Hormuz. It caught fire and later sank. According to Singapore’s maritime authority, all 21 crew members were evacuated and no one was injured. A second Singapore-flagged ship, GFS Giselle, was hit the next day. It reached a safe anchorage with its 22 crew unharmed.

Hours after GFS Pride went down, a second ship sank. The Cape Dao, flagged in Antigua and Barbuda, had been hit by a projectile on 23 September in an attack that killed one seafarer. A rescue attempt failed. The Guardian calls both vessels container ships. The BBC describes the Cape Dao as a bulk carrier, and CNN simply calls it a merchant vessel.

Who fired is disputed. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said a cargo ship hit naval mines while using an “unauthorised” route. The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre (UKMTO) reported that both ships were struck by unidentified projectiles, and experts quoted by CNN said a drone attack was more likely than a mine.

The headlines say “Hormuz” as if everyone knows why it matters. Here is the short version, and why two lost cargo ships matter even though neither carried oil.

A narrow door with a lot behind it

The Strait of Hormuz lies between Oman and Iran. It is the only sea route from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the open ocean. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) calls it one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints, deep and wide enough for the largest crude tankers.

Before this war, the numbers were huge. In the first half of 2025, according to the EIA:

So Hormuz isn’t only “an oil story.” It is a gas story too, and above all an Asian story. Europe and the United States feel it mostly through world prices. In 1H25 the US imported only about 0.4 million barrels a day through the strait.

Why there is no easy detour

Other chokepoints have long, expensive detours. Ships avoiding the Red Sea, for example, sail around Africa. Hormuz has no sea detour. The only alternatives are pipelines that reach ports beyond the strait. Per the EIA, Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi pipeline could together carry about 4.7 million barrels a day around Hormuz. Iran’s own Goreh-Jask line has an effective capacity of about 0.3 million. Even used to the full, these pipelines cover roughly a quarter of normal flows. The EIA lists no comparable bypass for gas, most of which comes from Qatar.

The detours can be hit too

Those pipeline numbers are a ceiling, not a guarantee. Pipelines and pumping stations are targets, and this region has proved it. In September 2019, drones and missiles struck Abqaiq and Khurais and suspended 5.7 million barrels a day of Saudi output, about half the kingdom’s production. The Houthis claimed it, but UN investigators concluded they did not launch it, and Washington blamed Iran. Output was not fully restored until 3 October. It has happened again this autumn. Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry said attacks on 10 September hit the East-West pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions and forced a precautionary shutdown. Reports differ on who did it: Al Jazeera cites drone strikes blamed on Iraqi militias, while The National points to the Houthis. Kpler data cited by AFP show flows halted from 11 to 22 September. On 4 October a pumping station at Khurais was reportedly struck. An AFP source said flows stopped again, but Bloomberg reported the line was running, and on 6 October the energy minister said it was carrying 5.8 million barrels a day. So the bypass worked in the end, but for close to two weeks the main detour around Hormuz was itself shut. Any estimate of how much oil can avoid the strait should be read as “if the pipelines are not under attack too”.

What closes a strait is risk, not wreckage

This is the key point, and the one headlines tend to blur. A sunken container ship doesn’t physically block a channel built for supertankers. Ships keep moving. What changes is whether owners, crews and escorts judge the passage worth the danger.

That is how Hormuz “closed” this year without a single wall across it. The BBC reports that after the war began in February, the strait was effectively closed by Iranian missile and drone attacks on commercial ships, together with a US naval blockade of Iranian ports. A preliminary deal in June to reopen it collapsed within weeks. EIA data show the effect plainly. Oil flows through Hormuz averaged 21.6 million barrels a day in late 2025, 14.9 million in the first quarter of 2026, and 4.9 million in the second. LNG flows fell to 0.8 billion cubic feet a day. The EIA notes that ship-tracking signals there have been “especially unreliable” since late February, so these figures are being revised often.

Then traffic partly came back. The US military began guiding and protecting ships on a route nearer Oman’s coast, including what CNN describes as escorted night-time “dark” transits with transponders switched off. Analysts at Kpler, cited by the BBC, estimated that last month crude exports through the strait had recovered to around 80% of the pre-war level of 16 million barrels a day.

Treat that recovery figure with care, because the trackers disagree and they measure different things. For September, the New York Times got about 10 million barrels a day through the strait from Kpler, 7.9 million from Vortexa and 7.4 million of crude from TankerTrackers, against roughly 16 million before the war. The National cites other Kpler figures that put September at just under 9 million, about 44% of February’s 20.6 million, while the US energy secretary claims up to 14 million. The higher totals of around 18 to 19 million barrels a day are total Gulf exports, bypass pipelines included, not flows through the strait. At its best, in late September, the seven-day average through Hormuz peaked at about 16 million and then fell to 9.9 million by 7 October as attacks picked up. In short, flows through the strait itself have not returned to the 20.9 million of 1H25. The pre-war numbers above are a baseline, not today’s level.

That recovery is what this week’s attacks target. The IMO counts 113 confirmed incidents and 24 seafarer deaths in the region as of 14 October. Its list has more than 20 entries for October alone. UKMTO reported nine attacks in or near the strait since Monday, and Kpler counted only about 4.1 million barrels crossing on Monday, less than a quarter of pre-war levels. The Guardian cites a Financial Times analysis finding 24 ships hit in the two weeks to 11 October, five of them tankers.

So the sinkings matter less for what the ships carried than for what they signal: that a ship can be lost outright, even on the escorted route. Until this week, IMO records show only one vessel sunk in the whole war, the Safeen Prestige in March.

Why the timing is political

Two Iranian officials told Reuters, as quoted by the Guardian, that the change of tactics was decided at the top. Its aim, one said, is “to frustrate efforts by the United States and its allies to bring down global oil prices” before the US midterm elections on 3 November. The Guardian reports that US fuel prices have risen almost 70% since the war began. That is the mechanism the EIA describes in general terms: even a temporary blockage at a major chokepoint can mean supply delays, higher shipping costs and higher world energy prices. I won’t guess where prices go next. This post explains a mechanism and is not advice about any market.

Opinion: watch the risk, not the headline count

When people hear “Hormuz,” they tend to picture an on/off switch: open or closed. The past eight months suggest a dial is the better picture. Flows slid to a trickle and climbed back toward 80% under escort. Now they are being pushed down again, not by blocking the water but by making each crossing feel more dangerous.

That is why I would read the next weeks through a few plain questions rather than the drama of any single strike. Are escorted convoys still moving? Are crews still willing to sail? Do the EIA and Kpler flow figures hold up? Two ships sinking is a tragedy for those on board and a warning to everyone else. Whether it becomes a closure depends on how many owners decide the warning applies to them.

I also think the seafarers deserve more of the headline than they get. Twenty-four have died in this conflict, by the IMO’s count. They are the people physically standing in the narrow door the rest of the world relies on.

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