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Why Europe Can't Simply Replace Starlink for Ukraine

A constellation of small satellites over a night view of Europe, with glowing signal lines beaming down toward Eastern Europe
Summary

This week Ukraine reported that SpaceX's military Starshield service slowed down for fast-moving terminals, hurting its drones, just as missile warnings seemed to go missing. Europe wants to help but has no ready substitute: its only low-orbit network, Eutelsat's OneWeb, has a few hundred satellites against Starlink's roughly 10,000, every terminal would need replacing, the EU's pooled GOVSATCOM service runs on a handful of distant geostationary satellites, and the IRIS² constellation will not start launching before 2029. Explainer with a short opinion section.

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On Wednesday, Ukrainian officials said that Starshield, the military-grade version of SpaceX’s Starlink service, had stopped working properly on terminals moving at high speed. That matters because many of those terminals ride on drones, both the ones Ukraine sends to strike and the interceptors it uses against incoming attack drones. A presidential adviser, Serhii Beskrestnov, said the cap was 100 miles per hour, roughly 160 km/h, and that the military got no warning.

The same week, President Zelenskiy said that for two nights running Kyiv had received no advance warning from partners of Russian ballistic missiles. Donald Trump said the United States was still sharing intelligence. Elon Musk then wrote that Starshield systems “are owned and controlled by the US government” and that any speed limits are decided by the US military “and ultimately POTUS.”

Who decided what is still not proven. What the episode did prove is something Europe has known for a while and kept postponing: if American satellite services are slowed or switched off, there is nothing European ready to take their place. This piece explains why.

Two different dependencies

It helps to separate two things that got mixed together in the headlines.

The first is communications. Starlink is a network of satellites in low Earth orbit, which ESA defines as anything below about 2,000 km. Because the satellites are close, the signal delay is short and the terminals can be small. That is what makes it usable on a drone or a moving vehicle.

The second is early warning. That is a separate system entirely. The United States runs a constellation called the Space-Based Infrared System, which detects the heat of missiles as they launch. A Chatham House associate fellow, Marc DeVore, told Reuters plainly that “there is nothing equivalent in Europe.” Fabian Hoffmann of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies described Europe’s ability to replace it as “very limited.”

The rest of this piece is about the first problem, because that is the one where Europe at least has something to offer. On the second, the honest answer is short: for now, Europe has no substitute.

What Europe actually has

OneWeb. Eutelsat, the French-led operator, owns OneWeb, the only other low-orbit internet constellation in operation. According to Reuters, Starlink has around 10,000 satellites in orbit and OneWeb a little over 600. Eutelsat’s shares jumped 23% on Wednesday, its biggest one-day gain in 16 months, on bets that governments will look for alternatives. That is a market reaction, not a capability.

The capability gap is bigger than the satellite count. The independent satellite consultant Christian Freiherr von der Ropp told Reuters that OneWeb’s design was “conceived a decade ago”, and that the cost, weight, bulk and power use of its terminals limit it on the front line. He also pointed out the practical problem: Starlink and Starshield terminals use proprietary technology. They cannot simply log on to OneWeb. Switching would mean replacing thousands of terminals, in the middle of a war.

GOVSATCOM. The EU’s pooled government satellite service went live on 14 January 2026, using capacity from eight satellites already in orbit, provided by France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Luxembourg. The Commission confirmed this week that it is discussing Ukraine’s access to it, and it plans to add commercial capacity from early 2027.

That helps for secure links between headquarters and units. It does not help much with drones. The pooled satellites are geostationary, which ESA puts at an altitude of 35,786 km, at least 18 times higher than the upper edge of low Earth orbit. Distance means delay and bigger antennas. That is fine for a command post. It is a poor fit for a small aircraft flying fast and low.

IRIS². This is the EU’s own answer to Starlink. In August the Commission signed an agreement that expands the constellation to 348 satellites, 330 in higher low Earth orbit and 18 in medium Earth orbit, including 66 added specifically for defence, security and emergency use. It also brought the first launches forward to 2029, with accredited services from 2030 and about €4 billion in extra funding. “Accelerated” in this case still means at least three years before the first satellite goes up. Germany, Reuters notes, is building a military constellation of its own on top of that.

Why this was predictable

This is not the first time a single company’s decisions shaped what Ukraine could do. In September 2023 Musk said that in 2022 he had refused a Ukrainian request to activate Starlink near Sevastopol for an attack on Russia’s fleet. His biographer first wrote that Musk had switched coverage off mid-attack, then corrected that account: the coverage had never been on there, and Musk declined to turn it on.

The details differ, but the lesson is the same. When one provider owns the satellites, the terminals and the software, it holds a switch, and so does whichever government can lean on it. Europe even pays part of the bill. Poland’s foreign minister Radosław Sikorski has said Warsaw spends around $50 million a year on Ukraine’s Starlink subscriptions. This week he posted on X that Poland, as a customer, was “watching” Musk.

Opinion: the gap is a decade of choices, not bad luck

I don’t think Europe lacks the engineering. It lacks the habit of buying its own capability before the crisis that proves it needs it. GOVSATCOM was announced in 2018 and, by one count, went live at least a year later than the timeline the EU itself set out in 2024. IRIS² was accelerated only after the political mood changed. Each delay looked cheap when it was decided.

The useful response now is not to cheer a share price or to wait for 2029. It is to treat the next three years as a bridge to be built on purpose. That means buying commercial capacity quickly, funding terminals that can work across more than one network, and being honest that missile early warning is a separate and harder gap that money alone won’t close quickly.

The reason to do this isn’t distrust of one company or one president. Any single switch, held by anyone, is a risk for whoever depends on it. Ukraine has learned that twice now. Europe should not need a third lesson.

Sources

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