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A Digital Bank Lent to Its Owners and Paraguay's President Fell With It. Why Does Insider Lending Keep Breaking Banks?

An old colonial bank building with closed wooden doors on an empty street at dusk, palm trees and streetlights behind, and a smartphone with a dark screen lying on a stone bench in the foreground
Summary

Ueno, a fast-growing digital bank used by about 60% of Paraguay's adults, was taken over by the central bank on 2 November after regulators found its capital was less than half the legal minimum, largely because of loans to companies tied to its own owners. Within four days the president was removed from office. How insider lending works, why it has broken banks from Mexico to the Dominican Republic, the case that it can sometimes work, what the deposit guarantee did and did not protect, and what could change. Explainer with a short opinion section.

On the morning of 3 November, millions of people in Paraguay opened a banking app and found they could not reach their money. The app belonged to Ueno, a digital bank that said it had about 2.9 million customers, roughly 60% of the country’s adults. Wages, pensions and small-business accounts froze at the same moment. Three days later the Senate removed President Santiago Peña, who until 2025 held a small stake in the bank’s parent group, and a judge later ordered him held in pretrial detention. He denies any wrongdoing and has pleaded not guilty.

The political drama is the headline. The mechanism underneath it is older and duller, and it has broken banks on every continent: a bank lending its depositors’ money to companies owned by its own owners.

What regulators say happened

Paraguay’s central bank, the BCP, put Ueno into “resolution” on 2 November, the strongest step short of liquidation, after finding that its solvency ratio (capital against risk-weighted assets) had fallen below half the legal minimum. Supervisors had already flagged about $146 million in loans to three companies linked to Grupo Vázquez, the bank’s controlling shareholder, in a June 2026 report.

A confidential 199-page central bank file sent to prosecutors, which the Argentine newspaper La Nación says it has seen, describes the alleged pattern in three steps. First, shareholdings in borrower companies were moved to trusted individuals so the firms would no longer count as “related”. Then came long loans of seven to ten years with no collateral beyond a signature. Finally, when the regulator ordered the loans treated as related in June, the bank sold them for $74.4 million to another group company, which, according to the file, had first received the money it paid with from other firms that had borrowed from Ueno. These are the regulator’s findings as reported by one newspaper; none has yet been tested in court.

Why lending to yourself is so dangerous

Banks are built on a conflict of interest that law tries to contain. Owners put in a little capital; depositors provide most of the money. If the owners control lending, they can send cheap, unsecured credit to their own businesses. If those businesses fail, the owners lose their small stake and the depositors, or the deposit insurer, carry the rest.

The best-known measurement comes from Mexico. Economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes and Guillermo Zamarripa studied loans made before the 1994–95 crisis and found that related loans made up about 20% of commercial lending, carried interest rates about 4 percentage points lower, and were 33% more likely to default after controlling for borrower characteristics. The default rate on loans to related people and private firms was 77.4%, against 32.1% for unrelated borrowers, and recoveries were about 30 cents per dollar lower. They called the pattern “looting”.

That is why the Basel Committee, which sets global supervision standards, has a whole principle on it: transactions with related parties must be on arm’s-length terms, no better than those given to strangers, with independent oversight and limits.

The case that insider lending can work

The opposite view deserves a hearing. The historian Naomi Lamoreaux showed that in early nineteenth-century New England, banks lent mainly to their own directors and their relatives, and this financed industrialisation. Insiders knew each other’s businesses better than any credit score could, at a time when information was scarce.

But Lamoreaux’s banks operated with high capital and with shareholders, not small savers, carrying most of the risk. The danger grows when capital is thin, deposits come from millions of ordinary people, and a guarantee stands behind them. The Mexican study tested exactly this “information” explanation and found the data fitted looting better.

Paraguay has been here before, and so has its region

Between 1995 and 1998, 13 banks and 35 financial firms closed in Paraguay, with direct costs that the IMF estimated at 10% to 13% of GDP, and connected lending was among the causes. In the Dominican Republic, fraud and insider lending at Baninter in 2003 helped produce a banking crisis that the IMF’s representative said cost about 20% of GDP. In Brazil, the central bank liquidated Banco Master in November 2025 amid fraud suspicions, and the private deposit guarantor faced its largest payout ever, about 41 billion reais. The common thread is not a country’s politics but a bank whose owners could reach the lending decisions.

What was new in Paraguay is speed. A phone-based bank can sign up half a country in a few years, and it can freeze half a country overnight.

What the guarantee protected, and what it did not

Here the system partly worked. Paraguay’s deposit guarantee fund covers up to 75 monthly minimum wages, 228.3 million guaraníes per depositor per institution, which reports convert at roughly $36,000 to $38,600 depending on the exchange rate used. Congress passed a law in days to pay advances quickly. By 9 November the central bank said 93.1% of Ueno’s clients had received money, about 2.1 trillion guaraníes (some $340 million) across 1.74 million accounts. According to ABC Color, the fund was built from initial state capital plus regular levies on banks and finance companies, so the first bill falls on the banking system rather than directly on taxpayers.

The guarantee does not cover big balances, and the biggest belonged to the public sector. Ueno held roughly $800 million to $850 million in public funds (reports differ), including between $355 million and $380 million from the social security institute IPS, which pays pensions and health care. The Conversation reports that IPS relaxed its rules for bank deposits in 2023 and removed a capital-based exposure limit in 2024, while its deposits at Ueno rose. Whether retirees lose anything depends on what can be recovered from the bank’s assets, and prosecutors have asked the United States, Luxembourg and Argentina for help tracing them.

There is also a deeper cost. Economists Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache found across many countries that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the chance of banking crises where institutions are weak, because depositors stop checking where they put their money. A guarantee buys calm today, and it only stays cheap if supervision is strong.

Why didn’t the supervisor act sooner?

Critics point to closeness between regulators and the regulated. Carlos Carvallo, who chaired Ueno’s predecessor company, was appointed central bank president in 2023; he resigned on 3 November and has been charged. The central bank says he recused himself from all Ueno decisions. The impeachment charges against Peña alleged conflicts of interest and manipulation of oversight; he called the affair a regulatory issue, and his lawyers said he had less than 12 hours to answer some 300 pages of charges, which the Senate did not extend.

There is also a real dilemma, separate from any wrongdoing. Closing the bank that holds accounts for most of a country’s adults risks a run on every other bank. Supervisors often hope a troubled lender can be recapitalised quietly, and sometimes that works. The June order to reclassify the loans shows the central bank was acting; the question is whether it moved too slowly once the bank found a way around it.

Paraguay’s wider picture is not a collapse. According to The Conversation, the IMF projected 4.4% growth for 2026, and the country won investment-grade ratings in 2024 and 2025. Its government has been one of Washington’s closest regional allies. That reputation for stability is exactly what is now being tested.

Opinion: three cheap rules, and one honest trade-off

Ueno did something good before it did something bad. It gave bank accounts and even credit cards to people that traditional banks ignored, and it would be a mistake to answer its failure by making it harder for the poor to get a bank account.

But three rules would have made this much less likely, and none is expensive. First, nobody who ran a bank should supervise it within a few years of leaving, recusal or not. Second, public pension and health money should never be concentrated in one private bank beyond a fixed share of that bank’s capital, and the limit should be in law, not in a board’s discretion. Third, when a supervisor orders loans reclassified as related, any sale of those loans to another company should be frozen until the money’s origin is checked.

The trade-off is real: stricter rules slow down new banks, and new banks are how competition and inclusion arrive. The answer is not to stop fintech growth, but to make the owners’ money, not the savers’, the first to burn when a bank lends to itself. Courts will decide who is guilty. The rules can be fixed now.

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